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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF EMBODIED METAPHOR IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
VESTIBULAR DYSFUNCTION, ANXIETY AND THE SELF

By
Kaitlyn Abrams
December 2021

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Alexander Kranjec
There is considerable evidence that vestibular dysfunction and anxiety are
correlated. Clinical and philosophical arguments suggest that a loss of sense of self,
experienced through symptoms like derealization and depersonalization, might contribute
to this relationship. The present study used a mixed methods approach, including
Systematic Metaphor Analysis, to analyze written short answer and quantitative survey
data from one hundred and thirteen participants with vestibular disorders. The Systematic
Metaphor Analysis revealed several primary metaphor concepts which elucidated the
connections between concrete experience and abstract concepts in vestibular dysfunction.
These included metaphors of Agency, Stability, Orientation, Self-Object, and FigureGround. Primary metaphors for each of these broader concepts were used to interpret
quantitative results and to expand and explore phenomenological structures common to
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the experience of vestibular disruption. I argue that vestibular function is central to
“grounding” perceptual experience by organizing the relationship between the body, self,
and world. Implications for embodiment philosophy, including the importance of
vestibular function in maintaining a “ground” of experience as well as clinical
implications, such as the quality of dissociative symptoms for patients with vestibular
dysfunction, are discussed.
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Introduction
The following dissertation explores the phenomenology of vestibular dysfunction and its
relationship to anxiety and representations of the self. The study methods and conceptual
rationale are oriented around Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999; 2008) “grounded cognition” model,
which holds that abstract concepts and affects are metaphorically grounded in concrete,
embodied experiences.
The existing clinical literature suggests a strong relationship between vestibular disorders
and anxiety. A connection also exists between vestibular dysfunction and dissociative symptoms
such as derealization and depersonalization (Renaud, 2015). However, the interplay between
vestibular dysfunction, anxiety and dissociative symptoms has not been well-investigated.
Despite this, relations between these phenomena have strong theoretical grounding in the
philosophical literature, particularly in the phenomenology of embodiment. The work of
“embodied cognition” philosophers, such as Merleau-Ponty and Lakoff & Johnson, offers
theoretical avenues for understanding how anomalous embodied experiences, such as vertigo,
might give rise to anxiety and a loss of sense of “self.”
This study explored these correlated experiences through a mixed methods approach,
including a first-person methodology to understand how patients with vestibular disruption use
metaphor to describe their experiences. A correlational and quasi-experimental approach was
then be used to test the hypotheses of grounded cognition, which suggest our embodied
experiences lay the template for more abstract experience (such as language, affect, cognition,
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etc.). In addition to hypothesis testing, this survey data provided another means of interpreting
the qualitative results.
Phenomenologically informed research with this population offers important
opportunities. First, centering personal narratives could significantly deepen the understanding of
these individuals’ experiences as well as inform clinical intervention and rehabilitation. There is,
to my knowledge, no qualitative research exploring the experiences of anxiety and dissociation
with patients with vestibular dysfunction. Working with participants who are differently
embodied may also serve to further theoretical understanding of embodiment philosophy.
Clinically, understanding how the cognitive and linguistic framing of vestibular dysfunction
interacts with anxiety may inform novel approaches to rehabilitative and psychotherapeutic
intervention in this population. Additionally, the relationship between anxiety, vestibular
dysfunction, and dissociative symptoms is understudied with clinical populations. This work
may also inform how vestibular dysfunction and perceived handicap might be shaped by
psychiatric symptoms. More exploratory research could help clinicians distinguish between
differing psychiatric processes in this population.
Research with patients experiencing vestibular dysfunction may serve an important role
in providing empirical evidence to support broader ideas related to embodiment and language.
There is a need for embodied cognition research that engages participants with disabilities or
other different embodiments. Findings from this study using a patient population could offer
support and avenues of critique of Lakoff & Johnson’s work, support for which has primarily
come from research with non-clinical populations.
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Literature Review
Overview of Clinical Literature
The heart of the vestibular system lies in the small, intricate pathways of the inner ears.
These vestibular receptors work to detect head position and movement. Information from these
receptors become “immediately multisensory and multimodal” in the central nervous system as
the vestibular system coordinates information from the eyes, motor, and proprioceptive systems
to inform us about our body’s position in space (Angelaki & Cullen, 2008). This coordination of
head position, motion, and other sensory inputs gives rise to our sense of balance, spatial
orientation, and body schema. As such, the well-tuned vestibular system allows us to efficiently
orient in space. This underlies our ability to navigate, anticipate our own body position, and
remain oriented. In short, by integrating multisensory information, the vestibular system
mediates a harmonious relationship between body and world.
Disorders or dysfunctions of the vestibular system create conditions for disorienting,
unreliable, or incongruent perceptual relationships with the world. Vestibular dysfunction has
diverse symptomologies and etiologies. Typically, these include experiences of vertigo and
dizziness as well as difficulties with balance, proprioception, and spatial orientation. These
experiences are not uncommon. Perhaps the reader has had an occasion of dizziness while
looking down from a height? Or illusory self-motion when a train next to your stopped train
starts to pull away from the station? Such “normal” experiences of vestibular symptoms are
common with an estimated 35% of adults over age 40 in the United States exhibiting evidence of
balance disruption (Agrawal et al., 2009). That estimate increases to 85% in adults over 80 years
old (Agrawal et al., 2009). Disruptions in vestibular functioning can accompany an array of
3

etiologies, ranging from benign and transient to severe and chronic. Additionally, other clinical
syndromes such as diabetes, cerebellar disorders, or stroke can result in increased symptoms of
vestibular dysfunction. A more in-depth look at specific etiologies relevant to the study sample
will be offered in the results section.
Though “everyday” vestibular irregularities are common, disruptions in vestibular
functioning can reach a point where is categorized as pathological. Vestibular disorders are
broadly divided into two categories: peripheral and central disorders. Central disorders are
vestibular disorders caused by damage to the brain and central nervous system, for example brain
stem injury that leads to persistent experiences of imbalance. Peripheral disorders are
characterized by injury to or dysfunction of vestibular structures that are not part of the central
nervous system. This most commonly includes disorders of the inner ear or structures of the eye.
In 2006, the Committee for Classification of Vestibular Disorders of the Bárány Society
met to formalize a classification system for the diagnosis of vestibular disorders (Bisdorff, Von
Brevern, Lempert & Newman-Toker, 2009). This included a description of the phenomenology
of specific symptoms as well as how these track to specific diagnoses. Though there is some
overlap in symptom presentation between peripheral and central vestibular disorders, there are
several distinctions that aid in diagnosis as well as determining a course of symptoms and
treatment. For example, all vertigo generally arises from a sudden “mismatch” between neural
activity. However, the source of the “mismatch,” whether it is from a peripheral or central
source, is what determines how an episode unfolds over time, as well as the shape of other
accompanying symptoms (Bisdorff, Von Brevern, Lempert & Newman-Toker, 2009).
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The vertigo experienced in peripheral disorders typically takes the form of “external
vertigo;” objects in the room or the room itself appears to move. Symptoms of peripheral
disorders are experienced as episodic, come on suddenly, are tied to triggers and often resolve
within a day. Often, patients who suffer from a peripheral disorder can describe the first time
they experienced symptoms. Peripheral symptoms are likely to include experiences that point to
the involvement of peripheral structures, such as auditory or visual disturbance (Shepard, 2009).
This contrasts with “internal vertigo” which, broadly, is experienced in dysfunction
resulting from central disorders. These experiences are characterized by a sensation of “spinning
within the patient’s head,” of “self-motion” (Shepard, 2009; Bisdorff, Von Brevern, Lempert &
Newman-Toker, 2009). With respect to symptom onset, patients with central disorders describe a
more subtle or vague onset of symptoms that do not resolve. Central symptoms can include
experiences that point to central nervous system involvement such as lack of coordination,
difficulty swallowing, and trouble speaking (Shepard, 2009).
A range of common peripheral and central disorders affect the vestibular system. But the
most frequent is a peripheral disorder known as benign postural positional vertigo (BPPV),
which occurs when sudden changes in head position trigger bouts of mild to intense vertigo and
dizziness. Estimates of the lifetime prevalence of BPPV range from 2.4%-3.9% (von Brevern et.
al., 2007; Kerber, et al., 2013). This condition is often idiopathic, meaning there is no underlying
pathology or cause and that symptoms are often intermittent. Other vestibular disorders, such as
vestibular neuritis, arise from underlying inflammation of the vestibular nerve, causing dizziness
and vertigo.
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Many vestibular disorders, even those of benign etiology, are experienced as quite
disabling. Research suggests that vestibular symptoms, such as vertigo and dizziness, have a
significant impact on quality of life (Neuhauser, Radtke, Von Brevern, Lezius, Feldmann &
Lempert, 2008). Results from a quality-of-life study with patients with active Ménière's disease,
a chronic vestibular disorder, suggest that the vertigo associated with Ménière's is one of the
most debilitating conditions that does not require institutionalization (Anderson & Harris, 2001;
Yardley, Dibb & Osborn, 2003). These symptoms can also put patients at risk for other negative
health outcomes, such as increased risk of falls and avoidance behaviors (Neuhauser, et al.,
2008).
Relationship Between Vestibular System and Anxiety
Part of what appears to be especially disabling about vestibular disorders is a high cooccurrence of psychiatric symptoms. The relationship between psychiatric disturbance and
vestibular disorders has been well-established (see Jacob & Furman, 2001 for review; Jacob,
Redfern & Furman, 2008). Vestibular symptoms, such as dizziness and vertigo, have been
strongly associated with anxiety in particular (Polak, Klein, Rafael & Rabey, 2003). Estimates on
the comorbidity of dizziness and anxiety symptoms range from 11% to 28.3% in community
samples (Yardley, Owen, Lazarus & Luxon, 1998; Wiltlink, et al., 2009). These connections are
particularly salient in clinical work as psychological distress is one of the primary determinants
of lower quality of life ratings and higher disability ratings in vestibular patient populations
(Yardley, Owen, Lazarus & Luxon, 1998). Other factors that contribute to a patient’s perceived
level of handicap include fear avoidance, increased fall risk and chronicity (see Yardley, 2000
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for review). Combinations of symptoms, such as experiencing dizziness and imbalance
concurrently, also contribute to increased anxiety (see Yardley, 2000 for review).
Though the literature demonstrates that anxiety and vestibular dysfunction often cooccur, this relationship is not exclusive. Anxiety can occur in the absence of vestibular symptoms
and vice versa. Anxiety can both predispose patients to vestibular symptoms and arise secondary
to the onset of vestibular disorders (Staab & Ruckenstein, 2003). As a result, several
explanations have been proposed for the relationship between anxiety and vestibular dysfunction.
Biomedical discourse focuses largely on the close neuroanatomical interconnections between the
vestibular and limbic systems, the limbic system being involved in the regulation of emotions. In
fact, research suggests that stimulation of the vestibular system is an effective therapy for stressrelated disorders such as conversion disorder and mania (see Rajagopalan, Jinu, Sailesh, Mishra,
Reddy & Mukkadan, 2017 for review). Psychogenic explanations for vestibular symptoms
suggest primarily psychiatric causes. Dizziness has long been recognized as a symptom of
anxiety and panic disorders and cross-sectional studies suggest that approximately 20%-25% of
cases of chronic dizziness occur in the absence of neurotological disorder (Kroenke, Lucas,
Rosenberg & Scherokman, 1993).
Current consensus utilizes the classification of functional dizziness, which describes the
subjective experience of vestibular symptoms regardless of structural abnormality or
pathophysiology (Dietrich & Staab, 2017). A primarily psychogenic origin of functional
dizziness is suggested when subjective dizziness and imbalance occurs despite normal clinical
performance on vestibular measures. Psychogenic dizziness and imbalance symptoms can follow
provocative situations, occur during times of increased stress, or arise as in response to a
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patient’s postural overcompensation (Brandt, 1996). Certain personality characteristics, such as
obsessional features, high neuroticism and low extraversion also contribute to a “hallmark”
profile of functional dizziness (Brandt, 1996; Dietrich & Staab, 2017). These functional
disorders are also distinguished from primary psychiatric disorders.
These findings suggest that the relationship between anxiety and vestibular symptoms is
bidirectional, with the question of causality being one of the “chicken or egg” variety. Studies
suggest that patients with panic disorder often have subclinical vestibular dysfunction and
neurological or inner ear abnormalities (Jacob, Furman, Durrant, & Turner, 1996; Jacob,
Lilienfeld, Furman, Durrant & Turner, 1989). Additionally, there is evidence to support the
effectiveness of antidepressants to mitigate chronic dizziness as well as evidence to support
vestibular rehabilitation as an effective intervention for anxiety (Staab, Ruckstein & Solomon,
2002; Zimatore, Badaracco, De Angelis & Tufarelli, 2007). Causal bidirectionality between
anxiety and vestibular symptoms, despite their considerable overlap across etiologies, suggests
that their relationship is important. While the present study did not attempt to untangle the nature
of their causal relationship, the intention is to further explicate the connection between these
often-debilitating symptoms through patient experiences that are rich in their descriptions of both
anxiety and vestibular dysfunction.
Relationship Between Vestibular Dysfunction and Disruptions in the Sense of Self
In addition to anxiety, evidence suggests that patients with vestibular disorders also
experience disruptions in their “sense of self,” which can lead to a range of consequences such as
personality changes and dissociative symptoms (Smith & Darlington, 2013). Patients with
vestibular disease report symptoms of derealization and depersonalization at a significantly
8

higher rate than controls (Sang, Jauregui-Renaud, Green, Bronstein & Gresty, 2006). Whereas
derealization describes subjective experiences where the outside world is felt to be not quite
“real” depersonalization is defined by “subjective experiences of unreality in one's sense of self”
(Simeon, 2004).
Experimental research suggests a link between the vestibular system and symptoms of
derealization and depersonalization. Stimulation of the vestibular systems in healthy participants
produced similar symptoms related to “loss of sense of self” (Sang, et al., 2006). Anxiety appears
to influence subjective personality change in patients with vestibular dysfunction as well. One
study suggests that the presence of anxiety made depersonalization and derealization symptoms
more severe and more frequent for patients with vestibular disorders (Kolev, GeorgievaZhostova & Berthoz, 2014).
Overview of Philosophical Literature
One way of understanding the connections between vestibular symptoms and a disrupted
“sense of self” is through literature on the phenomenology of the body. This section begins with
an introduction to Merleau-Ponty's embodied phenomenology and moves towards relevant
philosophical concepts to illustrate how concrete disruptions in bodily experience can affect
more abstract experiences, such as self-awareness, cognition, and consciousness. The importance
of these concepts to understanding how vestibular disorders may contribute to the experience of
“self” will be explored through an outline of philosophical embodiment theories.
Much of the conceptual grounding for work in “embodied cognition” is attributed to the
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. In his work, The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty

9

(2011) posited a theory of consciousness which is centered in participatory perception. The body,
according to Merleau-Ponty (2011), actively engages in the act of perception, rather than
perception occurring through a series of mechanistic, stimulus-response reactions. MerleauPonty (2011) rejected the idea of “mind” as transcendent from the body, a thesis which
complicated the naturalist-pragmatist idea of a hierarchical model of cognition. Instead, MerleauPonty centered bodily perception as consciousness in active relation to the world.
Making sense of the connections between vestibular dysfunction, anxiety and body
schema engages a rich philosophical legacy. One valuable contribution to understanding the
importance of intact vestibular function to the experience of self is in Erwin Straus’s (1952)
phenomenological analysis of verticality in The Upright Posture. This work provides an
important philosophical foundation for the embodied relation to space. In his analysis, Straus
emphasizes that human physiognomy necessitates moving through space in an “upright” way.
Being vertically oriented requires psychologically and physically negotiating opposing forces,
like gravity. Failing to negotiate these may result in stumbling or falling. He writes, “[The
upright posture] contains a psychological element. It is pregnant with a meaning not exhausted
by the physiological tasks of meeting the forces of gravity and keeping the equilibrium” (Straus,
1952, p.530). This touches on the idea that physical experience is imbued with psychological
meaning and vice versa. Straus also introduces that the psychological importance of upright,
embodied experience is illuminated linguistically. He points out the double meaning of
“upright;” both to “stand on one's own feet” as well as, “the moral implication, not to stoop to
anything, to be honest and just, to be true to friends in danger, to stand by one's convictions”
(Straus, 1952, p. 532). Thereby, disruptions of these negotiations, such as through paralysis,
disease or prosaic experiences of imbalance have both physical and psychological consequences.
10

Straus argues that the human sense of “self” and self-efficacy is itself informed by
remaining upright, that is, by maintaining balance. He writes, “A biologically-oriented
psychology must not forget that upright posture is an indispensable condition of man's selfpreservation” (Straus, 1952, p. 532). Straus suggests that because our verticality puts us in
relation to competing downward physical forces that put us at risk for falling, anxiety and
balance inherent in the human sense of self. Individuals, such as those with ongoing vestibular
dysfunction, who are in constant battle against this equilibrium or for whom the battle is a losing
one, are likely to experience psychological consequences, changes in the self and a perceived
lack of self-efficacy.
Building on these philosophies, contemporary neuropsychological inquiry understands
cognition as an emergent consequence of an organism’s interaction with its environment
(Johnson, 2007). The “embodied approaches” hold that the body plays an active role in cognition
and perception. Echoing Merleau-Ponty, in embodied cognition, the “key assumption [is] that the
body functions as a constituent of the mind rather than a passive perceiver and actor serving the
mind” (Leitan & Chaffey, 2014). Interaction with the environment does not afford the possibility
of cognition rather, in embodied approaches, the interaction is cognition.
An example of how these embodiment philosophies is employed in contemporary
neurophenomenology, I will introduce the ideas of “body schema” and “body image.” The
concept of body schema has been taken up in myriad ways in psychological, medical, and
philosophical research. In the work of Merleau-Ponty (2011), “body schema” describes the
unconscious experience of our bodies. It refers to the regulation and experience of pre-reflective
action in goal-directed behavior. The definition of “body image” is more controversial. I have
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borrowed from Gallagher’s (2005) neurophenomenological definition of “body image.” To
contrast body schema and image, body schema is catching a fly ball -- attention is on the ball,
our movements flow towards the goal and we are not thinking “about” our bodies. In body
schema, the awareness of the body per se becomes “hidden” behind the actions oriented towards
the goal (Gallagher, 2005). Body image refers to the conscious thoughts, feelings, and
perceptions that we have about our bodies. Body image is learning a new dance step -- we think
about where our right foot should go next, we look in the mirror to see if our form is correct and
adjust. In body image, our attention is directed towards our body itself.
The vestibular system contributes to body schema by coordinating multisensory
information about our body position in relation to space. Fluid coordination of this information
allows a harmonious relationship between body and space. This congruency allows for the
completion of goal-directed behavior without having to think “about” the body itself; the
“actions can be hidden behind the goal.” In other words, fluid, harmonious sensory information
that allows for orientation and accurate perception as to the body’s position in space contributes
to an intact body schema. Because the body schema relies on coordination between body and
world, in Straus’s words (1952), the body schema is not “a concept or image which a person has
of his own body...the body-scheme is also experienced as an I-world relation.”
Coherent body representation, as evidenced by an intact body schema, influences
experiences of “body ownership” wherein our body feels like it “belongs” to us and we feel
agency over our movements (Lopez, et al., 2008; Metzinger, 2007). Having a sense that our
bodies and its parts are “ours” is a key component of self-awareness. Feeling my body as “mine”
underscores control of body movements, agency, and internal representations of self (see
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Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach & Gallagher, 2007 for review). As our bodies constitute our
experience of the world, disruptions of the body schema, such as those experienced in vestibular
dysfunction, can produce feelings of disembodiment affecting our representations of “self” (see
Lopez et al., 2008 for review).
Overall, philosophical theories of embodiment suggest that body schema is predicated on
a congruent relationship between body and space. An intact body schema is central to
experiencing bodily control and internal representations of self as well as a sense of ownership
over one’s body and movements. Vestibular dysfunction may disrupt the body-space
relationship, resulting in effects to body agency and self-experience.
Metaphor and Representation of Body-Space Relationship
There are many avenues through which to explore the embodied experience of self. The
methods and conceptual rationale for this study are oriented around Lakoff & Johnson’s
(1999) “grounded cognition” model. Their work arises from cognitive linguistics which holds
that abstract concepts and affects are grounded metaphorically in our bodies’ interactions with
natural forces. In cognitive metaphor theory, the term “metaphor” is not used to refer to a poetic
or literary device as most people commonly understand the term. Simply put, according to
cognitive metaphor theory, we use concrete body experience to inform our understanding of
abstract concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In this way, metaphors provide a productive
structure for grounding thought in everyday experiences (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) Lakoff &
Johnson (2008) write, “Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in
thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is
fundamentally metaphorical in nature.” In this way, metaphor use reveals a “cognitive
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unconscious,” which is both evident in our “automatic” use of metaphor and in the shared pool
of metaphors from which we draw to describe experience. Analyzing and contextualizing these
metaphors can be an entree to the unconscious structures of embodied phenomena.
For an example, we have experience of our bodies in different situations that inform
metaphors such as “I’m out of it today.” “Out of it” is understood to express feeling like “not
myself.” These specific metaphors cohere around the metaphor that the “self” is an object, and in
particular, a kind of container. Our concrete experience tells us that objects can be contained
within containers; when they are outside or spilling out, they are uncontained. The more abstract
experience is that being “not myself” is being “outside” of the self-container that usually
organizes my experience. This is also evidenced in Straus’s (1952) reflections on what it
metaphorically and literally means to be “upright.” We have a concrete experience of “standing
tall,” being visible, balanced on two feet and being vertically oriented, which can aid us in
imaging the more abstract concepts of morality: being an “upright citizen.” In metaphoric
language, we rely on an “image-able” experiences (a container, someone standing tall) to help us
grasp more abstract concepts (not feeling like myself, morality).
There have been several novel empirical studies which provide support for Lakoff &
Johnson’s model. As an example, one study of neurotypical participants were invited to two
experiments (Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010). The first experiment asked participants to recall either
positive or negative autobiographical memories while moving a set of marbles up and down
(Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010). Participants were able to retrieve more memories when the
movement was congruent with the emotional valence of the memory (i.e., up for positive
memories, down for negative) (Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010). The implication of the Casasanto &
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Dijkstra (2010) study is that our embodied knowledge of verticality (i.e., “up and down”)
interacts with the mental representations of emotional “up and down.” This suggests that the
interplay of motoricity, perception and cognition contribute to the formation of abstract
representation.
Empirical support for grounded cognition hypotheses relies primarily on non-disabled
samples. A critique of Lakoff & Johnson is that their work assumes a universalized human body
when discussing how concrete experience grounds abstract concepts (Scully, 2012). Researchers
in disability studies have highlighted the need for “embodied cognition” models to include
inquiry into “anomalous” bodies and different kinds of embodiment (Scully, 2012). For one, the
universality of physical forces, like gravity, inform a sense of shared experience. We all interact
with gravity. However, this can be totalizing, as the relationship of our bodies to gravity might
change depending on our bodily capacity, the environment, the heuristic of a story (or poetry) or
an imaginary realm. Though Lakoff & Johnson touch on the cross-cultural validity of the basic
structures of embodied representation through metaphor, there is plenty of room for dialogue and
critique. Metaphors grounded in a “universal human body” may limit understanding of how
different embodiments engage metaphor.
Grounded cognition models offer another way of conceptualizing somatopsychic and
psychogenic explanations of embodied experience. Complicating the directionality concepts that
underscore psychogenic versus somatopsychic models, grounded cognition implies the
bidirectionality of embodied experience, cognition and affect. Examining metaphor fits
conceptually with the multisensory and multimodal nature of vestibular signals, as metaphor
itself is an example of, “cross-domain conceptual mapping” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2008, p. 57).
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The relationship is also interactional; examining metaphor use allows for the exploration of the
representational relationships and meanings between anxiety, dissociation and vestibular
experiences.
Two relevant examples that explicate a relationship between vestibular dysfunction,
anxiety and self-representation from Lakoff & Johnson’s work are the metaphors of the self and
metaphors of the mind. They write, “There are ways in which we try to control our bodies and in
which they ‘get out of control’” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 267). There are a few metaphor
“concepts” which are evident in the vestibular patient literature. Many can be tracked onto
broader metaphor concepts which refer to self-location. One is the self-as-container metaphors,
where the self, or instance of the self, can be “located,” for example the metaphors of feeling
“out of balance” or “out of it.” These are locational in that they imply a “place” and describe the
location of the experienced self as being “out.” Another example is present in the research
literature where patients with vestibular dysfunction endorsed a variety of metaphors to describe
their symptoms such as feeling “spacy” or “spaced out” (Zolev, Georgieva-Zhostova & Berthoz,
2014). These are also metaphors of self-location, “spacy” meaning the experienced “self” is not
quite on Earth any longer. These “locational” metaphors, gained from looking at the larger
clinical discourse, might imply that vestibular function contributes to self-location. Through the
analyses below, I will continue to deconstruct common metaphors in patient narratives to
understand what structures metaphors used by participants reveal about vestibular experience.
As has been summarized here, vestibular disorders, anxiety, and sense of self are
fundamentally interrelated. This project aims to understand how mismatches in body-space
relationships, such as is seen in vestibular symptoms, are represented through metaphor. The
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representational nature of metaphor seems apt to illuminate the meanings of incongruent bodyspace relationships, particularly as understood through anxiety and dissociative symptoms.
Through an exploration of how concrete experience informs abstract concepts, the cognitive
linguistic model offers a conceptual match to the multimodal and multisensory nature of
vestibular experience. As a phenomenologically informed project, my goal is to elucidate some.
To this end, the study had the following aims:
1. To gather quantitative survey data from a vestibular patient population on measures of
perceived handicap, anxiety and depersonalization-derealization symptoms. Hypothesis
testing was done to assess how these measures influence one another and are correlated.
2. Systematically analyze the types of metaphors typically used by participants with
vestibular disorders to describe their experiences through collection of qualitative,
narrative data from a vestibular patient population. A collection of primary metaphors
was developed.
3. Experimentally test the principles of cognitive metaphor theory by framing vignettes with
vestibular metaphors and assess their effect on self-reported anxiety in the vestibular
patient population.
4. Assess individual and sample-level differences in quantitative survey data to interpret
metaphor themes which emerge from the qualitative, narrative data.
A final aim is to center ethical practice by engaging first-person methodologies to provide
individuals with anomalous embodied experience a voice in the grounded cognition literature. In
the following section, I will outline the methodology and methods used in this study.
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Methodology
“Mixed method” models often contain inherent epistemological and ontological frictions.
Natural science models have an epistemological commitment to objectivism and positivism,
whereas phenomenological inquiry typically relies on constructivist and interpretivist paradigms.
While some have argued there is an insurmountable incompatibility which prevents combining
these disparate approaches, others have employed considerable creativity in designing
psychological and philosophical research which combines both.
This study employed Gallagher’s (2003) “front-loaded” phenomenology, which seeks to
embed phenomenological principles into experimental design. This method informs the design of
the study to elicit experience and to vary experience through investigation. “Front-loaded
phenomenology...incorporates a dialectical movement between previous insights gained in
phenomenology and preliminary trials that will specify or extend these insights for purposes of
the particular experiment or empirical investigation” (Gallagher, 2003; Zahavi, 2009). For
example, many studies regarding experiences of agency and body ownership have employed this
methodology. In one study, participants engaged in a version of the “rubber hand illusion” (RHI;
Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Participants were able to voluntarily control the index finger of the
rubber hand. The experiment was then varied to introduce different iterations of the illusion, to
determine when “ownership” and agentic control of the hand could be established and
dissociated (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). The design of the study was intended to incorporate
theory of complex phenomenon of embodied agency and varied the conditions to further expand
the understanding of this experience.
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In keeping with this tradition, this study is a mixed methods design that includes
qualitative, systematic metaphor analysis methodology, including the use of a structured
questionnaire. Centering individual experience shows fidelity to phenomenology and offers a
contrast to the positivistic natural science approach which seeks to “objectify” experience.
Hearing from participants first-hand and interpreting their experiences subjectively, offers the
possibility of multiple meanings and perspectives to arise. Ethically, it engages an
underrepresented population in exploring their lived experience. The quasi-experimental second
stage of the design was intended as another way to interpret subjective experience through
objective methods.
Data collection and interpretation was based on a method of systematic metaphor analysis
by Schmitt (2005). Schmitt’s (2005) methodology was developed as a “workable system” to
approach qualitative research based on Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999) work. The cognitive linguistic
model holds that metaphors are not isolated phenomena; rather, they often track to a limited pool
of basic “metaphorical concepts.” For example, items endorsed by vestibular patients such as
feeling “spaced out” or feeling “out of it” track to Lakoff & Johnsons’s (1999) basic locational
metaphor of “the self as container” (p. 275). The approaches to eliciting metaphors outlined
above are also discussed in his methodology. Schmitt’s outline is a general procedure for the
“reconstruction of metaphorical points of view” of the participant. Analysis of individual
metaphors was oriented towards organizing individual turns of metaphor first into metaphor
concepts and then into broader metaphor themes.
Schmitt (2005) suggests a few broad steps of analysis and interpretation. First, is
identifying a topic of interest. Second is gathering a collection of individual “background”
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metaphors, which situates the metaphoric use in a “cultural” context. Background metaphors are
those which are found in the clinical literature. These serve to set a “background” of
conventional metaphor use which can then be compared with the metaphor use in the study
sample. For this study, background metaphors were collected in the process of literature review,
an examination of clinical materials such as symptom inventories and informal patient
descriptions (YouTube, written patient testimonials, blogs etc.). This provided grounding for the
phenomenon of the use of metaphor in vestibular disorders, as well as attuning me to broader
themes across discourses as well as competing metaphorical usage.
The cognitive linguistic model holds that metaphors are not isolated phenomena; rather, they
often track to a limited pool of basic “metaphorical concepts.” I looked to Schmitt’s procedure
for the “reconstruction of metaphorical points of view” of the participants, by assessing for
common underlying linguistic structures in these metaphors. I then pooled the individual
metaphors and considered what broader concepts these common structures created. From these,
"primary metaphors” were developed.
Primary metaphor structures included the concrete experience in which the metaphor is
situated and the abstract concept to which the metaphor tracks. An example of a primary
metaphor might be “knowing is grasping” which is grounded in the concrete experience of
holding something in one’s hand and tracks to a more abstract concept of “holding” information
“in mind.” Another, relevant to this study, would be “symptoms are external forces” which
tracks to the concrete experience of being impacted by forces/objects and the more abstract
concepts that symptoms can “hit” you. In this study, these primary metaphors were developed
and examined in different contexts to elucidate aspects of experience.
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In addition to the qualitative and survey data, this study utilized a phenomenologically
informed quasi-experimental design. As will be described in detail below, metaphor concepts
such as “self-as-container,” distilled from qualitative analysis of public patient testimonies and
Lakoff & Johnson’s work were used to generate different vignettes. Written vignettes were
chosen to keep the method on the same cognitive-linguistic plane of the “stimuli.” Three
conditions were developed: two “provocative” conditions using either the self-as-container or
balance metaphors and a “literal” condition. Metaphor and literal primes were normed for
similarity in meaning.
To minimize confounds, each condition utilized the same “template” vignette.
Metaphorical or literal language was input throughout the vignette to “frame” the vignette while
making the scenario consistent across conditions. The vignette paradigm is developed from
Thibodeau & Boroditsy (2011) which used “virus” or “beast” metaphors to frame a template
vignette about crime and then asked participants to make social judgements. Thibodeau &
Boroditsky (2011) found that metaphor frames influenced the kinds of social judgements
participants made about crime and which strategies they chose to employ to manage crime. The
current study employed this dual metaphor paradigm to frame a template vignette about a
potentially anxiety-provoking scenario. The analogue to the Thibodeau & Boroditsky (2011)
study in this case was to determine whether metaphor frames influence affect and affective
reasoning, as measured by anxiety ratings and strategies to control anxiety.
In sum, the methods below are part of a phenomenologically-informed approach to mixed
methods analysis. This includes gathering of quantitative data and a systematic metaphor
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analysis of qualitative data. This systematic metaphor analysis was also used to generate an
experimental approach aimed at determining whether relevant metaphor frames will influence
participant affect.
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Method
Participants, Sample Size and Recruitment Procedures
The online study survey was accessed by 265 respondents. A total of 113 eligible
participants with a self-reported history of vestibular disorder diagnosis completed the survey.
These 113 participants provided the data which was included in the final analyses. Additional
demographic and clinical description of the sample is included in the Results section below.
Prior to informed consent, participants were screened for eligibility (see Table 1). Given
the linguistic nature of the study, participants with severe cognitive deficits were excluded as
were non-native English speakers. As this study is primarily interested in experiences of
vestibular dysfunction, participants who have vestibular symptoms consequent to other primary
diagnostic concerns (such as schizophrenia, mania, TBI, dementia, etc.) were excluded.
Participants were recruited online, primarily through the email newsletter of the Vestibular
Disorders Association. As this investigation concerns the effect of metaphor use in this specific
clinical population, only individuals who reported having been diagnosed with a vestibular
disorder were included. Information about diagnoses was collected but no exclusions or
inclusions were be made primarily based on etiology of vestibular disorder.
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Table 1
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Criterion
Language
Age
Diagnosis

Cognitive status

Inclusion
Native English speakers

Exclusion
Non-native English speakers

>18

<18

Primary vestibular
diagnosis

Other primary diagnoses (i.e., TBI,
serious mental illness, stroke,
dementia)

No self-reported history of
severe cognitive deficits

Self-reported history of severe
cognitive deficits

Recruitment materials, distributed online, included a brief overview of inclusion and
exclusion criteria as well as a link to the online survey itself. By this mode of recruitment,
collection of potentially identifiable information was limited. Identifying information obtained
during recruitment, such as a potential participant’s email address or identifying information in
their narratives, was kept in a password-protected database.
Following screening for eligibility, participants provided informed consent. The informed
consent document, which outlines expectations for the participants, an outline of risks/benefits,
privacy information and a statement on voluntariness preceded any collection of study data (see
Appendix C). Participants were informed of their rights as a participant. Participants were
provided with the phone and email address of the investigator if they have any questions before
consenting to the study. Participants gave consent by electing to continue to the study materials.
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Participants were informed that they can withdraw their consent at any time by discontinuing the
online survey. Incomplete survey data was not used in the analysis.
This study followed the ethical and legal guidelines outlined by the Duquesne University
IRB. Every effort was made to minimize risks to subjects and protect participant privacy.
Possible risks to participants included increased anxiety during surveys or while answering
questionnaires. Participants may not have benefited from their participation in the study.
Participants were entered into a drawing to win a gift card for their participation.
Design
This project employed a mixed methods approach, with survey data and narrative
responses from a sample of patients who have been diagnosed with a vestibular
disorder/vestibular dysfunction. Design was correlational, with a between groups design for the
experimental manipulation. The study gathered data in one online survey that included
qualitative data from a structured questionnaire and quantitative data from a clinical battery,
described below.
Materials
Materials for the study fell into three categories. First were the clinical measures to
collect quantitative survey data. Second was the structured questionnaire used to collect
qualitative data about participants’ experiences with vestibular dysfunction. Third was the
vignette and follow-up questions, used to experimentally determine whether metaphor framing
affected participants’ scores on a post-vignette anxiety scale.
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The clinical measures included the Dizziness Handicap Inventory (DHI; Jacobson &
Newman, 1990), a well-validated measure of subjective experience of the functional interference
of dizziness and the Vestibular Activity and Participation (VAPS; Alghwiri et al., 2012), a wellvalidated self-report instrument which assesses the extent to which an individual’s activity is
restricted by vestibular symptoms. The Derealization and Depersonalization Inventory (Cox &
Swinson, 2002), a reliable measure of these symptoms in clinically anxious populations as well
as the Beck Anxiety Inventory, a clinical measure of anxiety (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993) was also
be administered.
Metaphor primes for the short answer questions and vignette were developed adapting
Schmitt’s (2005) qualitative method. Metaphors used in public testimonies/blogs of patients with
vestibular disorders as well as clinical materials (questionnaires, etc.) were also included.
Metaphors developed from this phase were normed for equivalency to literal counterparts via
online survey, using a predeveloped paradigm for norming metaphor with their literal
equivalents (Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2016; Cardillo, Schmidt, Kranjec & Chatterjee,
2010). The experimental conditions for the study were then drawn from these preliminary
metaphors to create the “balance” metaphor primes, the “self” metaphor primes, and the literal
primes. These are outlined below (see Table 2).
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Table 2
Metaphor Primes Developed for Use in the Experimental Conditions
Balance
Off-kilter
Off balance
Keep yourself grounded
Disoriented

Self

Literal

Out of it

Distracted

All over the place

Negatively

Keep yourself together

Keep yourself calm

Falling apart

Confused

Participants were presented with an online, structured questionnaire in which they are
asked to write short answers to open-ended questions. The open-ended format was intended to
elicit the kinds of metaphors these individuals use to talk about their experiences. This elicitation
was done in two ways, in accordance with Schmitt’s (2005) guidelines. First, basic metaphor
concepts, described above, were used to frame the questions. Second, participants were asked to
describe different elements of their experiences including experience of symptom onset,
experience of symptoms themselves, situations that trigger anxiety and strategies they use to
mitigate their symptoms. The questionnaire was structured using both approaches to elicitation to
generate a maximum amount of metaphor material. The purpose of the structured questionnaire
was to engage participants in elaborating their experiences of vestibular symptoms, anxiety, and
their sense of self. The questionnaire (showing balance/self/literal versions) is reproduced
below:
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1.
Can you describe a particular experience when your
vestibular disorder made you feel [out of it/off-kilter/less able] to
function?
2.
With regard to your vestibular difficulties, can you tell me
about particular places that make you feel [unstable/like you’re
not yourself/irrational]?
3.
Can you describe a general activity that is likely to [throw
you off/cause you to feel out of control of yourself/exacerbate
your anxiety?
4.
What strategies do you use to [stay on balance/pull
yourself together/manage your symptoms] when you are in a
potentially triggering situation?
This survey included an experimental manipulation based on vignettes with metaphor
frames. Participants were assigned to an experimental condition, as outlined above. The
Participants were asked to read a short vignette about giving a presentation at work and then rate
“how anxious would this scenario make you?” on a 7-point Likert scale. The vignette (showing
balance/self/literal versions in {…}) is reproduced below.
Today you have to give an extremely important presentation at
work. As you begin, you notice you feel {off-kilter/out of
it/distracted} and that people are giggling. Knowing that stress can
{throw/send/affect} a person’s whole performance {off
balance/all over the place/negatively}, you try to keep yourself
{grounded/together/calm}. However, as you continue, it feels
like {you’re falling apart/disoriented/becoming less calm}. Even
though you continue to speak in front of your coworkers, bosses
and clients, you suddenly feel like you’re not okay. Your boss
interrupts you so abruptly it {makes you feel even more
disoriented/makes you feel even more out of it/confuses you}.
While she’s asking you a question about your work, it crosses your
mind that she thinks you’re mentally ill.
In addition to rating anxiety, participants were also asked to choose, from a limited set of
options, how they would deal with their anxiety if they were to be in that position. These options
included, “find something to lean on to steady yourself physically,” “gather yourself,” and
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“count to 10.” Lastly, participants were asked which element of the vignette would be most
anxiety provoking for them.
Procedure
Prior to subject recruitment and data analysis, preparatory work was conducted to collect
background metaphors and develop the experimental vignette, as described. Metaphors used in
the vignette were normed for comprehension and meaning via online survey. The study materials
were then developed into a battery on the online platform Qualtrics. After obtaining appropriate
IRB approvals, recruitment began via online communities, primarily the email newsletter of the
Vestibular Disorders Association.
Following informed consent, participants were randomly assigned either to the control or
literal primes) or experimental conditions (metaphor primes) for the experimental portion of the
study. Participants then completed the study materials, which included the quantitative measures
and structured questionnaire. Participants were also asked to read the experimental vignette and
answer questions related to the vignette, as described above. The order in which test materials
were presented was randomized. Upon completion of the battery, participants were shown a
screen thanking them for their participation. A schematic of the study procedures is included in
Appendix E.
Approach to Quantitative Analysis
Following data collection, demographic characteristics of the sample as well as
descriptive statistics for the primary measures were recorded. Correlations between the primary
measures (BAI, DHI, VAPS & DDI) were analyzed.
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A non-parametric, independent samples Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine
whether levels of handicap had an impact on differences in distributions on the clinical measures
as well as the post-vignette anxiety rating. This was done by stratified the Dizziness Handicap
Inventory scores into “low, medium and high” groups. Cut-off for inclusion of these groups is
based on clinical interpretation of the Dizziness Handicap Inventory (mild handicap=< 34,
moderate handicap = 36-52, severe handicap = > 54; Whitney, Wrisley, Brown & Furman,
2004). An outline of these results is described in more detail in the results section below.
Approach to Qualitative Analysis
As a way of orienting myself to the qualitative data, I first organized the narratives by
participant. This served to portray a sense of each individual and their unique experience. I then
organized the narratives by question to understand how specific prompts, intended to capture
participant descriptions of elements of symptomology, pulled for specific metaphors. These
included questions regarding experience of symptom onset, triggering stimuli, experience of
symptoms themselves, and strategies patients use to manage their symptoms.
In working to analyze the participant narratives, I realized just how often metaphor is
deployed in language. This, at times, made it difficult to discern how to group individual
metaphors. The pervasiveness of metaphor in everyday language also necessitated making my
own choices about how and which metaphors to include and how to be systematic about these
choices. Additionally, metaphor itself is multimodal; I found specific instances in which one
metaphor could be applied across concepts. As will unfold in the following sections, the process
by which themes emerged from participant narratives involved a hermeneutic process that
identified individual metaphors and their use within specific contexts.
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While working through this interpretation, I allowed my knowledge of the clinical
language, embodiment philosophies, and the quantitative data from these participants to shape
my understanding. I began by cataloguing figurative language use in the narratives. This
included noting metaphor use (“I am anchored”) as well as simile use (i.e., “like walking on a
boat at sea”). While I primarily used the individual metaphors to develop broader metaphor
concepts, the other figurative language was powerful and helped to situate participants’ lived
experience.
Adjustments to Schmitt’s Method. These adjustments to Schmitt’s (2005) method were
based on the unique characteristics of my dataset. First, I had to work with a broad but relatively
shallow pool of qualitative data. The short-answers from 113 people meant I was seeing
metaphor used to answer specific question about symptoms, rather than seeing how symptominfused metaphor might seep into descriptions that were not explicitly about symptoms.
Secondly, I had not considered that I would run into as much simile use as I did. Schmitt
makes no mention of simile, and I was not quite sure what to do with it initially. Simile use was
often a referent to bodily experience in the same way that metaphor use is. I prioritized
metaphor as the primary data for analysis. I used this prioritization to decide whether and when
to include simile use in the concept/theme formation. My “test” was whether or not “metaphor
vehicle” in the simile was comparative or categorical (Sam & Catrinel, 2006). So, for example, I
included, “I felt like I was walking on a trampoline” as “trampoline” related to a comparative
metaphor of “unsteady ground” which could be mapped onto a broader metaphor concept.
Contrastingly, similes of “drunkenness” were too categorical and too broad; I could not generate
one specific metaphor referent as the experience of “drunkenness” could mean a broad category
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of experiences. I did not include categorical simile in my metaphor concepts but did take these
categorical similes on their own terms when it seemed important to understanding aspects of
experience.
Third, I found it impossible not to assess the quality of metaphors in producing metaphor
groups and themes. Schmitt does not reference this per se, rather, he outlines a method that
groups concepts together by primary metaphor structure. Because of just how many participants I
had, I found this 1) not particularly generative and 2) extremely uneconomical. To adjust for this,
I needed to make informed decisions about where to start orienting my metaphor search. As you
will see below, I began by considering metaphor in the context of replies to specific questions
and descriptions of symptom experience. My method followed Schmitt’s recommendation to
first assess for underlying metaphor structures to elucidate underlying primary metaphors. I then
considered the context or quality of how these primary metaphors were used to move from
“concept” to broader themes. This process unfolded naturally, as will be shown in the case of
developing a theme related to moving from the primary metaphor, “symptoms-are-forces" to
iterations of experience captured by “symptoms-are-threatening-forces.” This is an expansion of
Schmitt’s method, though still faithful to the core components of his method.
Finally, I had to make my qualitative data functional for mixed methods interpretation.
The most economical way to do this was to identify metaphor concept/themes and then “code”
individual responses for the presence, absence, or combinations of specific metaphors. This
allowed me to produce “subgroups” of participants. An example of subgroups would be
participants who framed symptom onset as a “threat” versus those who did not. This allowed me
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to make comparisons between subgroups on certain measures and answer questions like, “did
participants who employed threat language report higher mean scores on the BAI?”
Though I looked at descriptive statistics for these kinds of post-hoc analyses, I did not
make any statistical inferences based on the results. These analyses were purely exploratory. The
aim of this mixed methods approach was not to do hypothesis testing but rather to use both kinds
of data to interpret one another. My hope is that reporting descriptive statistics mixed with the
qualitative results will generate potential future directions for inquiry, rather than imply
replicable results or generalizable conclusions.
My aim in using both a mixed methods approach is to use one set of data to inform and
interpret the other. As such, the discussion of qualitative results will weave the discussion of
quantitative and qualitative results together. At times, subgroup and individual scores were used
to further explore and interpret the qualitative results. The analysis is aimed at providing
evidence for the suggestion of how psychiatric symptoms and perception of handicap influences
the embodied experience of vestibular dysfunction.
The purpose of this data is two-fold. The first was to give voice to participant experience
and deepen an understanding of their experience through systematic metaphor analysis. The
second was to generate meaningful metaphors that are consistent with participant experience,
through which to interpret the results of the quantitative portion of the study. My aim during this
analysis was in service of the broad question that guides the project: Can interpreting language
use help us understand how and why vestibular patients experience this cluster of anxiety,
subjective handicap, and depersonalization-derealization symptoms?
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Results
The following presentation of results is broken down into a reporting of the quantitative
data followed by an integrated results and discussion incorporating the mixed methods findings.
Demographics
A total of 113 participants completed the survey, all who were included in the analyses.
The average age of the participants was 56.12 years (range = 26 - 87). Due to experimenter error,
the gender of 16 participants was not recorded. However, the gender-recorded sample was
predominantly female (female n= 78; male n=19). Using the 97 participants who did report their
gender, there were no significant gender effects on the means of any of the outcome measures.
Description of Etiologies
Participants reported a diverse range of etiology for their vestibular dysfunction. The
most reported etiologies were Ménière's Disease (n= 25), multiple etiologies (n=21), BPPV
(n=15) and vestibular migraine (n=10). Most of the sample reported peripheral etiology (n=
111) with a minority of the sample reporting central vestibular dysfunction (n= 3). The
etiological characteristics of the participants are summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3
Table of Etiologies Represented In The Sample
Etiology

Frequency

Percent

Ménière's disease

25

22.1

Multiple etiologies (peripheral)

21

18.6

Benign Paroxysmal Positional Vertigo

15

13.3

Vestibular Migraine

10

8.8

Labyrinthitis/Neuritis

10

8.8

Unknown Peripheral Vestibular Dysfunction

9

7.9

Vestibular hypofunction

6

5.3

Persistent Postural-Perceptual Dizziness

3

2.7

Acoustic Neuroma

3

2.7

Central Vestibular Disorder

3

2.7

Cervicogenic Vertigo

3

2.7

Bilateral vestibulopathy

2

1.8

Visual-ocular reflex disruption

1

.9

Ramsay-Hunt syndrome

1

.9

Oscillopsia

1

.9

The overwhelming majority of the participants in the sample had diagnoses that are
considered “peripheral vestibular disorders” (n=110). This is consistent with epidemiological
trends. As mentioned above, peripheral vestibular disorders are those whose symptoms arise
because of injury to or dysfunction of the “peripheral” structures of the vestibular system, such
as the inner ear, peripheral nerves, or eyes. This type of vestibular disorder contrasts with the
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“central vestibular disorders” where symptoms arise because of injury or dysfunction the brain,
brain stem or other structure of the central nervous system.
As this sample overwhelmingly included those with peripheral vestibular diagnoses, I
will dedicate most of this discussion to those. Peripheral vestibular disorders include a wide
array of diagnoses. The most represented in this sample was Ménière's disease, symptoms of
which include episodic vertigo, hearing loss and tinnitus as well as a feeling of pressure in the
ear. Ménière's can be experienced as “typical” with both cochlear (i.e., hearing loss) as well as
vestibular symptoms, or “atypical” in which only one set of symptoms is present. Symptoms can
last minutes, hours, or days and are caused by improper draining or absorption of endolymphatic
fluid in the inner ear. The second most endorsed diagnostic category in this sample were
“multiple etiologies” (n=21). These were all exclusively an overlap of peripheral diagnoses (for
example, Ménière's disease and vestibular migraine).
A diagnosis of Benign Paroxysmal Positional Vertigo (BPPV) was the next most
common diagnosis in the sample (n=15). As the name suggests, BPPV is a benign condition that
is characterized by a sudden onset of vertigo, nausea and/or imbalance and because of a
positional trigger. Symptoms are thought to be triggered when endolymph particles in the inner
ear are moved or displaced because of turning, lifting the head or other head movements. BPPV
most frequently has an idiopathic cause, though it can also come on because of head trauma,
which can release tiny particles into the inner ear. BPPV can co-occur with other vestibular
disorders, for example Ménière's. Episodes of BPPV typically occur in “spells” and frequently
resolve within minutes. Movement sensations associated with BPPV are most commonly the
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feeling of spinning, though a “floating” sensation is also common (Parnes, Agrawal, & Atlas, J,
2003).
The third most reported diagnosis was vestibular migraine (n=10). Vestibular migraine is
marked by vestibular symptoms, like vertigo, unsteadiness, and nausea, with or without the
presence of headache. Typically, people who suffer from vestibular migraines have a history of
motion sensitivity, such as car sickness. The course and cause of episodes are like nonvestibular migraine, as they are occurred in time-limited episodes and brought on by specific
triggers.
There are other disorders represented in this sample. Though I will not go into detail on
each one, every diagnosis includes the experience of vestibular symptoms, meaning experiences
of vertigo, dizziness, visual symptoms (i.e., bobbing vision), and/or postural symptoms (i.e.,
imbalance, falls, pulsion). Though there is considerable overlap in symptoms between different
peripheral vestibular disorders, there are distinctions in sensation that are associated with
etiologies. For example, vertigo associated with Ménière's is typically associated with a
“spinning” sensation whereas vertigo associated with postural vertigo can be experienced as
“non-spinning” (i.e., swaying) (Popkirov, Staab & Stone, 2017). Further, what is described by
patients as “vertigo” or “dizziness” may include other experiences, such as disequilibrium,
unsteadiness, and the sensation of falling. The presence of psychiatric comorbidities can also
complicate the clinical picture, as anxiety or derealization can color the experience and
description of symptoms.
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Quantitative Analysis
I will first present the descriptive statistics and hypothesis testing results. Later, these results will
be discussed with respect to qualitative results.
Descriptive Statistics for Individual Measures
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI). Scores on the BAI ranged from 0 to 50, with a mean of
19.74 and standard deviation of 18.28.
Vestibular Activity Participation Scale. Scores on the Vestibular Activity and
Participation Scale ranged from 5 to 128 with a mean of 70.25 and a standard deviation of 23.80.
Dizziness Handicap Inventory (DHI). Scores on the Dizziness Handicap Inventory total
ranged from 12 to 100, with a mean of 54.25 and a standard deviation of 19.94. The top score on
the Dizziness Handicap Inventory is 100. Clinically, scores on the Dizziness Handicap Inventory
are interpreted as representing mild (16-34 points), moderate (34-54 points) and severe (54+
points) handicap. The mean score on this measure indicates this sample experienced a moderatesevere level of handicap. The Dizziness Handicap Inventory consists of three subscales to assess
for functional, emotional, and physical handicap. Descriptive statistics for subscale scores on the
Dizziness Handicap Inventory are reported in Table 4.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Dizziness Handicap Inventory Subscales
Statistic

DHI Functional

DHI Emotional

DHI Physical

Mean

20.00

17.52

16.73

Median

20.00

18.00

18.00

Standard Deviation

8.09

8.38

6.11

Range

2-36

2-36

2-28

Derealization and Depersonalization Inventory (DDI). Total scores on the
Depersonalization-Derealization Inventory ranged from 0 to 92, with a mean of 30.62 and a
standard deviation of 18.28. A mean of 14.84 symptoms were reported, with a range of 0 to 28
symptoms endorsed. Consistent with previous literature utilizing this measure, the total number
of symptoms reported was used as the basis for analysis. Scores on the DDI were higher in this
sample than other vestibular patient samples (i.e., Toupet et al, 2019, Kolev, Georgieva-Zhostova
& Berthoz, 2014).
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between scores on the Dizziness Handicap Inventory, Vestibular
Activity and Participation Scales, Beck Anxiety Inventory, and Depersonalization-derealization
Inventory will be correlated. Scores on these measures were correlated (see Table 5).
Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient was used to determine the strength of
the relationships between multiple variables. Interpretation for the size of the correlation
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coefficients were based on Mukaka’s (2012) guidelines. As relevant to this study, a correlation
coefficient between 0 to .30 was considered negligible, .30 to .50 was considered low and .50 to
.70 was considered moderate (Mukaka, 2012).
Moderate, positive correlations were found between scores on the Beck Anxiety Inventory and
Dizziness Handicap Inventory BAI and Depersonalization-Derealization Inventory. Low,
positive correlations were found between the Vestibular Activity and Participation Scale and
Dizziness Handicap Inventory, the Dizziness Handicap Inventory and DepersonalizationDerealization Inventory and the Vestibular Activity and Participation Scale and Beck Anxiety
Inventory. Negligible correlations were found between the Depersonalization-Derealization
Inventory and the Vestibular Activity and Participation Scale. Scores on the DHI, Vestibular
Activity and Participation Scale, BAI and Depersonalization-Derealization Inventory were all
weakly, positively correlated with the post-vignette anxiety ratings.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables
Variable
1. Beck Anxiety

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

19.74

18.28

—

70.25

23.80

.31**

—

54.25

19.94

.46**

.51**

—

14.84

7.54

.51**

.24**

.41**

—

4.54

1.53

.34**

.29**

.19*

.30**

—

--

--

.41

.34

.39

.37

.28

Inventory
2. Vestibular Activities
and Participation
Scale
3. Dizziness Handicap
Inventory
4. DepersonalizationDerealization
Symptoms
5. Post-Vignette
Anxiety Score
Average
*

p < .05. **p < .01.
The second hypothesis tested concerned how perceived handicap, as measured by scores

on the Dizziness Handicap Inventory would relate to anxiety levels, depersonalizationderealization symptoms and anxiety ratings on the “vignette” rating.
Dizziness Handicap Inventory scores were stratified into “low, medium and high”
groups. As noted, cut off for inclusion of these groups is based on clinical interpretation of the
Dizziness Handicap Inventory (mild handicap=< 34, moderate handicap = 36-52, severe
handicap = > 54; Whitney, Wrisley, Brown & Furman, 2004). Most participants (n=65, 57.5%)
reported severe levels of handicap. Moderate levels of handicap were reported by 23% of the
sample (n=26) and low levels of handicap were reported by 19.5% of the sample (n=22).
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A non-parametric, independent samples Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine
whether levels of handicap had an impact on differences in distributions on the measures as well
as the post-vignette anxiety rating. There were no significant differences between levels of
handicap and the post-vignette anxiety scores, H(2)=4.48, p=.106. Non-parametric tests found a
significant difference in distributions and medians between levels of handicap on the Beck
Anxiety Inventory, H(2)=25.64, p=.000; Vestibular Activity and Participation Scale H(2)=26.68,
p= .000 and Depersonalization-derealization symptoms total H(2)=17.28, p=.000.
As expected, the median number of reported depersonalization-derealization symptoms
increased with level of handicap. There was a statistically significant difference in median
number of symptoms endorsed between mild (Median=8.50) and severe (Median=18.00) levels
of handicap (p=.002). Median number of depersonalization-derealization symptoms for moderate
handicap was 14.50 symptoms. The difference between mild-moderate and moderate-severe
levels of handicap was not significant (p=.05; p=.55).
As expected, the median number of reported anxiety symptoms, as measured by the BAI,
increased with level of handicap. The median anxiety score on the Beck Anxiety Inventory for
mild levels of handicap was 11.50, moderate was 15.50 and severe was 21.0. There was a
significant difference in median number of symptoms endorsed between mild-severe levels of
handicap (p=.000) and moderate-severe levels (p=.016). The difference between mild-moderate
levels of handicap on the BAI was not significant (p=.073). Median anxiety score between mild
and severe levels of handicap was clinically significant as well, as this difference represented
mild and moderate levels of anxiety, respectively. This interpretation is made based on
normative values for the Beck Anxiety Inventory reported in Gillis, Haaga & Ford (1995).
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Experimental Vignette Results
One post-hoc analysis was conducted. This hypothesis concerned whether self or balance
metaphor conditions modulated anxiety self-reports, as measured by distribution comparison
between groups on post-test vignette ratings.
Non-parametric comparison of distributions between conditions on post-vignette anxiety
scores were not significant, H(2) = 5.33, p=.070. Further, analyses of literal versus metaphor
conditions (both self and balance conditions) showed no significant differences on the postvignette anxiety measure scores between conditions H(1) = .125, p=.724. The means of anxiety
score for each group were as follows: balance (M=4.12), self (M=4.21), literal (M=4.54).
The average anxiety rating in this sample indicated the vignette, on average, appeared to
provoke anxiety (M=4.5, SD = 1.5). This mean corresponded to “moderately anxious” and “very
anxious,” per the scale. Participants were asked to choose, from a limited set of options, which
strategy they would use to assuage their anxiety if they were in the situation described by the
vignette. Most participants (48.7%) chose the option “find something to lean on to steady
yourself,” with another large proportion (40.7%) choosing “gather yourself,” and the smallest
proportion (9.7%) choosing “count to ten.” Participants were then asked which element of the
vignette they would find most anxiety-provoking. A portion of the sample did not answer this
question (n=31). There were a few consistent elements of the vignette which participants found
most distressing. Though the vignette was not specifically about experiencing a vestibular attack,
some participants (n= 18) named onset or feelings of vestibular symptoms as a primary source of
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anxiety. Participants may have been primed for this, having just answered a battery of questions
related to their vestibular symptoms and/or using the vestibular metaphor primes. Most
commonly (n=37), participants named fear of embarrassment and the perception of being
mentally ill as the most anxiety-provoking element of the vignette. Public speaking (n=6) and
being interrupted (n= 14) were also commonly reported. Other elements that provoked anxiety
were “inability to focus” (n=2), “not trusting my perceptions” (n=2), “fear of the unknown”
(n=1), “being unable to communicate” (n=1), and “being confused” (n=1).
Analysis of the experimental intervention was largely kept separate from the further
analyses below. However, consideration for why the metaphors used to frame the vignettes did
not produce results is interwoven in the presentation of qualitative results. Additionally, the
metaphors used to frame vignettes were also used to frame question prompts. These metaphors
did apparently resonate with participants, as will be discussed. These prompts and their metaphor
frames did elicit descriptions of aspects of vestibular experience and generate further
metaphorical language in experiential descriptions.
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Qualitative Results
I received a wealth of responses from participants. Each of the 113 individuals who
completed the survey took the time to write answers to the narrative prompts. Many of these
were detailed descriptions of experience, however some participants chose to answer in short
sentences or single words. As such, a portion of the responses did not include metaphoric
language for analysis (n=12). The remaining pool of stories (n=101) included rich, experiential
descriptions that allowed the opportunity to assess how vestibular patients broadly use
metaphoric language to explain the interaction of vestibular symptoms, anxiety, and their sense
of self.
In the following section, I will present the results from these participant narratives and
consider the influence individual and sample differences on the quantitative measures as these
themes emerge. This section is intended to allow the reader to understand how themes emerged
through the analysis. This section will additionally provide some discussion of these findings as
they emerged. These results will be used to inform the implications presented in the final
chapter.
Results are organized by four domains of patient experience, in accordance with the short
answer prompts. These are 1) symptom onset 2) symptom experience, 3) symptom mitigation and
4) cognitive experiences. They are summarized below along with the primary metaphors that
structure each domain as revealed by the analyses (see Table 6).
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Table 6
Symptom Domain and Related Primary Metaphors and Themes
Symptom Domain & Metaphor Themes
Symptom Onset
Agentic Metaphors

Primary Metaphors
Symptoms-are-external forces
Symptoms-are-threatening-forces
Symptoms-are-uncontrollable forces
Symptoms-are-acquisitions

Symptom Experience
Stability & Orientation Metaphors

Being stable
Being oriented
Drunkenness

Symptom Mitigation
Object Metaphors
Cognitive Experience
Figure-Ground metaphors

The self-is-a-physical object
Thinking-is-perceiving
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Symptom Onset
To begin: what exactly is a symptom? I approached this question through participants’
experiences of the onset of the experiential changes that might be called “symptoms.” This is the
place where patients recognized that experience has somehow become “different.” Participants
were asked to describe a situation or experience that made them feel “out of it,” “off-kilter” or
“less able to function.” To better understand what counted as a “symptom,” I looked to the
narratives that included descriptions of how these changes began or were triggered, aka
descriptions of “symptom onset.” I then identified metaphor use within these descriptions.
Most participants offered narratives about their experience of symptom onset (n=92).
Many individual metaphors used to describe this changing set of experiences could be grouped
into a metaphor concept related to Agentic Control. Two main primary metaphors in this concept
were symptoms-are-external-forces and symptoms-are-acquisitions.
The following structure is used to help understand how specific metaphors are rooted in
embodied experience by elucidating the primary metaphor, abstract concept, and the concrete
embodied experience from which the metaphor arises. An example is included for each.
Metaphors that captured “symptoms-are-external-forces" followed this primary metaphor
structure:
Primary metaphor: Symptoms are forces
Concrete experience: Feeling of being impacted by external forces
or objects
Abstract concept: Being emotionally and experientially “impacted”
by symptoms
Examples: “It came on suddenly,” “it hit me”
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The symptoms-are-acquisitions metaphors followed the structure of:
Primary metaphor: Symptoms are acquisitions
Concrete experience: Taking possession of an object
Abstract concept: Emotional and experiential changes can be
understood as additions or losses
Examples: “I got dizzy,” “I had an episode,” “I lost my balance”
I grouped these together as “Agentic” metaphors because symptom onset, as will be
shown in the analysis below, seemed to be marked by varying degrees of a loss of agentic control
of the body. Deconstructing these metaphors further, symptoms-are-external-forces metaphors
contained the meaning that 1) forces are causal and 2) forces are experienced as having their own
agency. Symptoms-as-acquisitions contain the meaning that 1) symptoms are objects 2) as
objects, symptoms do not have their own agency. Occasionally, both metaphor concepts were
present together, such as, “I was getting a vertigo wave,” or, “I was having a drop attack” but
this was less common.
I will use Barbara’s narrative, a 69-year-old woman with Meniere’s disease, to illustrate
the agentic nature of the symptoms-are-forces metaphor:
My attacks are totally disabling. I am unable to do ANYTHING
until I am medicated enough for it to finally end which is usually
hours later. I can’t open my eyes or move because if I do, I will
violently vomit. The attack also impairs me for a few days after
also.
Here Barbara imbues “attacks” with agency which cause a loss of body control for her.
They cause her to feel “totally disabl[ed] and “impair” her. She notes an awareness that symptom
onset is marked by this loss of bodily control, as she physically struggles to do “anything”
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including opening her eyes during attacks. Through this metaphoric language, Barbara is
communicating a high degree of perceived loss of bodily agency, which may relate to the severe
levels of anxiety, handicap and depersonalization-derealization symptoms she endorsed on the
quantitative measures.
The Agentic control metaphors spoke to symptom experience as a sudden, unpredictable
change in the relationship between individual and their expected experience. As evidenced in
Barbara’s account, this change often translated to an impact on perceived bodily control. The
shared “primary experience” in this metaphor is the experience of being impacted by an external
force. Being impacted by external forces often has the effect of altering one’s experience, such as
being impaired. The agency assigned to the symptom-forces is also evident in the grammatical
structure of this metaphor concept. The force, in this case the symptom, is the subject of the
sentence (I.e., attacks) which acts on the object of the force (i.e., “me”). To illustrate this further,
one participant wrote, “Vestibular neuritis attack hit Sept. 23, 2018.” The symptoms of vestibular
neuritis (subject) “hit” this participant (object), which elucidates an experience of being
forcefully impacted by symptoms on that day.
When symptoms are external forces, they cause other events that mark vestibular
dysfunction and changes in embodied experience to occur (i.e., dizziness, vertigo, etc.). Framing
symptoms as external forces implies that symptoms have agency as they cause changes in the
experiencer. This may also imply a loss of agency for the experiencer, as in the participant
example, “the vertigo attacks pull me down.” This statement implies the participant is
experiencing the “vertigo” as taking some control over their body movements.
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Symptoms-are-threatening-forces. As might be obvious looking at the participant
examples above, many of the symptoms-are-external-forces metaphors took on a particular
quality. The quality of the symptom “force” on the self were marked by descriptions of
vestibular disruption as sudden, assaultive, or antagonistic. This is also evident in metaphoric
clinical parlance which commonly refers to “attacks of vertigo” or “drop attacks.” Most straight
forward is the experience of disruption as an attack, as “attacks” are events that come from the
outside and negatively impact the subject with force.
Examples of this in participant narratives included:
“It hit me”
“My balance is challenged”
“My symptoms disable me”
“My symptoms are aggravated”
“I am thrown off”
“My system becomes taxed”
“My vertigo attacks pull me down to my left side”
The quality of the descriptions of experience seemed to form a metaphor theme of
“threat." In the above examples, the negative “impact” of these forces often referred to feeling a
loss of bodily control. In analyzing participant narratives, I coded participant responses for the
presence of “threat language” when their descriptions included the symptoms-as-external-forces
metaphor structure as well as a descriptive quality of the forces being antagonistic or assaultive.
Nearly half of participants who used metaphoric language employed “threat language” to
describe the experience of their symptom onset (n=43). As noted in the methods, this qualitative
data was made functional for means comparison by coding for the presence and absence of threat
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language. This resulted in two subgroups; those who employed threat language and those who
did not.
Descriptions of “attack” and “force” are consistent with the sudden-onset and timelimited nature of many peripheral vestibular episodes, where there is remittance and an onset of
disruption. The remittance is important, as that appears to be part of what generates threat for
patients: for symptom onset to be experienced, there must be a time with fewer or no symptoms.
Consistent with this, many participants spoke to the experience of having periods of “attack” and
remittance. Cynthia described her experience of symptom-onset this way:
One morning I awoke and could not get out of bed without falling.
I could not walk or stand. My husband called an ambulance which
took me to the local hospital where the diagnosis was "vertigo”,
and I was given meclizine which did not work very well.
Afterward, I spent about 10 years with no real help, enduring these
attacks which came on with no warning. When I felt an attack
coming on I panicked until I realized I just had to keep going. The
nature of these attacks has changed to unbalance but I still panic
when I get one.
Here Cynthia uses, symptoms-as-external-forces metaphor (“it came on”). This is
couched in a description of “attack” with “no warning,” which speaks to the language of
“threat.” As exemplified in this narrative as well as Barbara’s, threat language seemed relevant to
the interplay of anxiety and vestibular dysfunction. Threat language appeared to rely on the
symptom onset feeling sudden, unpredictable, and out of her control. Feeling an attack “coming
on” created a sense of panic. She outlines how her experience changes in the beginning of her
response; a symptom for her counts as an experience where her body control is severely
impacted. For Cynthia, symptom onset results in being unable to walk or stand. This
experientially was met by panic, perhaps as a function of a loss of ownership over her body. She
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reclaims some autonomy by “realiz[ing] [she] had to keep going,” which I take to mean both
physically moving forward as well as emotionally, so as to not be “controlled” by symptoms.
Some participants, as the participant above, describe the causal connections between the
onset of their vestibular symptoms and anxiety directly. Cynthia makes a clear connection
between her vestibular symptoms of vertigo and “unbalance” causing feelings of “panic.”
Cynthia reported moderate levels of anxiety on the Beck Anxiety Inventory. This is in the
context of her symptom presentation change to “unbalance” as well as having 10 years of
experience navigating vestibular symptoms. Despite this she still reports “panic,” and frames
these as “attacks.”
Fear and panic are common responses to experiencing threat. I expected those who
framed their symptoms as “threats” to report higher anxiety than those who used other
metaphoric language, such as symptoms-are-acquisitions. Framing symptoms-as-acquisitions
may suggest more “self-control” than in the external forces metaphors. To see if threat language
framing had an impact on anxiety, I looked at mean Beck Anxiety Inventory scores for the
subgroups mentioned above: those who used threat language in their description of symptoms
(n=42) and those who did not (n=46). The remainder of the sample either did not discuss
symptom onset or did not employ metaphor. For those who used “threat language,” means on the
Beck Anxiety Inventory were slightly higher than for those who did not use threat language
(M=22.21 versus M=17.89; BAI SD =18.28). As mentioned, I offer these mean differences to
explore and interpret the qualitative data without making statistical inferences on these post-hoc
analyses. My aim is to richly describe the data in this project, which includes using descriptive
statistics.
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When looking at the narratives of “highest anxiety” participants, meaning those who
scored at least one standard deviation above the mean on the Beck Anxiety Inventory (n=11), 6
employed threat-language, 2 employed non-threat language and 3 either did not describe their
experience of symptom-onset or did not use metaphor. Let us look at the words of one of the
highest anxiety participants, Stan, who employed threat language:
Within 6 months vertigo attacks began. Some episodes severe
enough to leave me on the floor vomiting and unable to walk. I
was under the care of a top ENT doctor who warned me that I
would progress into vertigo stage.
Stan describes vertigo episodes as “attacks,” and employed an agentic metaphor in the
wording of, “leaves me on the floor” in a debilitated state. This is consistent with threat language
implying a loss of agency by the experiencer. As with Cynthia’s testimony there is a sense of
feeling somewhat helpless, with symptoms causing severe disruptions in their lives (unable to
walk here, needing an ambulance in Cynthia’s case). The vulnerability inherent to potentially
experiencing attack also extends to the help they are receiving. Cynthia notes she went ten years
“with no real help” and Stan touching on further “threat,” in the form of a warning from an ENT
doctor that his symptoms would progress.
To summarize this concept to now, participants appeared to experience symptoms as
distinct shifts in experience, often marked by a loss of bodily agency. As such, metaphors to
describe symptom onset were categorized as Agentic Control metaphors. Within this concept
were primary metaphors which described these experiential shifts as either external forces which
impact them or objects that they acquire. The sudden, disabling loss of bodily agency was
conveyed in the metaphor, symptoms-are-threatening-forces. Experiencing symptoms as threats
may affect anxiety, as fear, anxiety and vulnerability are often responses to threat. This anxiety
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could be related to anticipated “attack” or indicate the anxiety that arises from experiencing a
greater degree of perceived loss of bodily control. These metaphors reveal a structure related to
agency, which implies that intact vestibular function aids in an experience of agentic, body
control. Next, I will build on the symptoms-are-forces metaphor to outline how forces being
perceived as uncontrollable impacted patient experience.
Symptoms-are-(un)controllable forces. Borrowing again from Cynthia’s narrative, the
language of “no warning” was often coupled with the use of threat language. Vestibular
symptoms can occur spontaneously, be tied to specific triggers, or be experienced as constant
(Bisdorff, Von Brevern, Lempert & Newman-Toker, 2009). Because the language of threat often
included the element of attacks as being unpredictable, I also assessed participant narratives of
symptom onset for metaphors of whether attacks seemed “spontaneous” or were “triggered.” As
an example of language used to describe “spontaneous” onset, one participant wrote:
I was 17 when I was first diagnosed. I was working in an ice cream
shop that would get really busy. I’d be working and out of nowhere
experience extreme dizziness and pain in my ears. I would have to
sit down otherwise I would vomit or pass out. I couldn’t do my job
due to this.
In this narrative the phrase “out of nowhere,” tracks to the experience of symptom-asexternal-forces as onset comes from outside the self and causes an impact to the experiencer.
These forces caused changes to agentic control of the body as illustrated by the phrase, “I had to
sit down otherwise I would vomit or pass out.” I considered descriptions like these
“spontaneous” as they lacked an expression of a causal relationship between one event an
another as part of symptom onset (event —> symptoms). In other words, spontaneous onset did
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not seem to be “triggered” by other events. They seemed to occur “out of nowhere” or “with no
warning.”
I was curious about how the experience of spontaneous onset impacted the use of threat
language. It seemed likely that those who had difficulty anticipating attacks due to spontaneous
onset, might experience them as more threatening, due to a lack of control in managing triggers.
In addition to symptoms onset descriptions, I had asked participants about their understanding of
places and activities that are triggers for vestibular disruption. I noted whether participants had
“well-defined” or poorly defined triggers. Here is an example of well-defined triggers:
Drinking anything with caffeine will trigger a vertigo attack. I can't
have anything that contains more than about 10 mg of caffeine in
one sitting. If I'm at a birthday party, I have to have smaller
portions of cake and ice cream. I've found too much sugar
definitely results in a bit of ear pressure.
These are clear triggers as this participant names specific stimuli, in this case caffeine, as
predictably causing vertigo. Clear triggers also implicitly offer the participant a means to
controlling symptom onset, as in this case, this individual can avoid caffeine and sugar and
expect to experience less vertigo.
I also noted where individuals named unclear triggers or more spontaneous onset.
Returning to Stan, he wrote, “it doesn’t really seem to matter, an attack can happen regardless of
where or what I am doing. Although, screen movement, computer or tv can help to trigger an
attack.” For Stan, attacks are largely unpredictable and lack a clear trigger, though he does note
that “screen movement” can be triggering. His statement largely conveyed a sense even if he
avoided screens, he would still be at risk for experiencing episodes.
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I also included diffuse or especially broad descriptions as unclear triggers such as,
“Whether it is trying to navigate through groups of people, walking through a parking lot, or
visually scanning items in a store my system becomes taxed, and I start to feel off." This
participant names a broad category of experiences which can be aggravating to her. She
communicates that there is no clear behavioral intervention to stave off symptom onset, short of
completely avoiding parking lots, shopping, or moving through groups of people, an approach
named “fear avoidance” in the literature (Dunlap, et al., 2021). These stand in contrast to the
“caffeine” example above, as those with less-defined triggers the participant is expressing that
they are less able to control onset through behavioral change and/or the onset of symptoms is
unpredictable.
As might be expected, most participants who described spontaneous onset of symptoms
did not describe well-defined triggers. Knowing one’s triggers seemed to me a pathway to
feeling in-control of symptoms, especially as the symptoms-as-force and threat language imply a
that the experience of symptoms is marked by a sudden loss of agentic control of the body.
Again, I did a simple coding of responses to indicate narratives that conveyed clearly defined
triggers and those that indicated unclear or diffuse triggers. Most participants discussed triggers
(n=84), with about half endorsing well-defined triggers (n=44) and half expressing unclear or
diffuse triggers (n=40). In exploring how understanding of triggers might influence anxiety, I
noted those who had well-defined triggers had lower mean scores on the Beck Anxiety Inventory
than those who had poorly defined triggers (M=17.3 versus M=23.4). Anxiety may be influenced
by a lack of self-efficacy in being able to control symptom onset. This is consistent with the
individual patient narratives above, as the participant who named caffeine as a primary trigger
reported a relatively low levels of both anxiety and subjective handicap (BAI=13; Dizziness
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Handicap Inventory total score =34). Stan, who noted feeling that an “attack can happen
regardless of where I am or what I’m doing,” reported a severe level of anxiety (Beck Anxiety
Inventory score = 50; more than 1 SD above the average of 19.74) and a moderate level of
subjective handicap (Dizziness Handicap Inventory total=46).
I wondered then how “threat language” and perceived control over symptom onset might
interact. Of the participants who used “threat language,” the majority indicated “spontaneous”
onset of symptoms (n=25, 58.2%). The remainder reported “triggered” symptoms (n=14, 32.5%)
or unremitting symptoms (n=4, 9.3%). Of those who used “non-threat” language, most described
spontaneous onset (n=20, 47.6%), followed by triggered onset (n=17, 40.4%) and a smaller
portion of unremitting symptoms or symptoms with no clear onset (n=5, 11.9%).
The use of threat language combined with a description of unclear triggers had an impact
on level of anxiety. Here is a participant example illustrates threat language combined with an
unclear description of triggers:
One experience with vertigo kept me so unable to function. It was
in the morning, I had showered, and while walking to iron my
clothes, it hit me. I sat down and waited for the dizziness to pass.
Hours passed before I was able to move and finally crawled back
to bed.
I have tried to narrow it down to certain activities, like boating.
However, vertigo hits whenever. Sometimes it is because I am
tired or stressed. Sometimes it is because I have gotten up too
quickly.
This participant, a 62-year-old woman diagnosed with Benign Paroxysmal Positional
Vertigo, scored a 41 on the Beck Anxiety Inventory which put her in the “severe” range. She
used threat language (“It hit me”), a spontaneous onset (“vertigo hits whenever”) and an
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expression of unclear triggers (“I have tried to narrow it down...”). Though I am speculating
about the source of her anxiety, this narrative suggests experiencing a lack of self-efficacy, in
part because she does not have a sense of control over when symptoms will come on or for how
long. This was consistent with her Dizziness Handicap Inventory scores, which corresponded to
a severe level of handicap (DHI total = 90). This lack of control might speak to a vulnerability,
which is conveyed in her use of threat language. This participant might provide insight into the
findings in the quantitative data, which suggested that higher anxiety increases perception of
handicap. Feeling more vulnerable to uncontrollable forces may create the sense that she is less
able to control her symptoms or engage in her preferred activity.
This interplay of control over symptoms and threat came through in a few other
narratives including:
When I had a drop attack and fell to the ground without warning
and immediately just as I was crossing at a streetlight.
Most public places, indoors that are crowded. Most especially
where many sounds are simultaneously buzzing. The spatial
awareness is a challenge. Pubs and restaurants are out. Retail
Stores can be a challenge.
This is a narrative of a 43-year-old woman diagnosed with Ménière's disease. Here she
demonstrates a few examples of threat language (“drop attack,” awareness is challenged,”) as
well as spontaneous onset (“without warning”) and diffuse triggers (“most public places,”
etc.) Broadly, her narrative conveyed a profound loss of bodily agency, as she experienced,
“fall[ing] to the ground without warning.” This participant also scored in the “severe range” on
the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the Dizziness Handicap Inventory (BAI=28, DHI=58). Of the
participants who reported the most anxiety, meaning a Beck Anxiety Inventory score in the
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“severe” range (n=26), most used threat language (57.7%), had unclear triggers (66.7%) and
reported spontaneous onset of symptoms (60.0%).
What about patients with less anxiety? I was curious about how those with minimal
reported anxiety spoke about their experience of symptom onset. I examined responses from
those individuals who reported the lowest levels of anxiety, meaning a Beck Anxiety score of 7
or below (n=12). Within this subsample, there were two instances of “symptoms as force”
metaphors: “it came on suddenly,” “it sends me into vertigo,” “brain fog settled in,” “the ground
was dropping out under my feet.” Notably, the use of these descriptions did not include the
more active, antagonistic, “threat” verbs and instead used more passive language of “came on
suddenly,” “settled in,” and “dropped out.” This could relate to a lower level of perceived loss of
bodily control; “sends into vertigo” is a measure of expressed severity from Stan’s example of
“leaves me on the floor.” One of the participants who reported low levels of anxiety described
their experiences as “attacks,” which was the only threat language noted. Others used the word
“episodes” or did not name the experiences. The remainder employed symptoms-are-acquisitions
metaphors, for example, “I would have brief moments of off-balance feelings.” Most had defined
triggers (86.7%). Half of this subset described spontaneous onset, while the remainder was split
between unremitting symptoms and triggered onset. These findings may imply that Agentic
control metaphors may reflect a continuum of experience. A high degree of perceive loss of body
control during attacks seemed to relate to more threat language as well as high perceived anxiety
and handicap. Narratives that conveyed less loss of perceived body control seemed to utilize
metaphor that reflected a higher degree of agency, and less reported anxiety and perceived
handicap.
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Interestingly, despite endorsing minimal anxiety on the Beck Anxiety Inventory and a
low level of perceived handicap, Cathy, the participant who used “the ground was dropping out,”
connected this experience of symptom onset to fear, anxiety and vulnerability:
I have felt scared, especially when I didn't know why the ground
was dropping out under my feet and why it felt like I was always
living on a boat. I also have fallen into deep periods of anxiety,
depression, and helplessness.
Again, here Cathy is describing an embodied experience but does not comment directly
on a severe loss of bodily agency. Interestingly, when asked about triggering situations, Cathy
outlined clear triggers for her anxiety rather than her vertigo symptoms. These included,
“Watching movies that include fast edits, bright strobes and lights.” Cathy expresses feeling
scared and relates it directly to the experience of unexpected sensations. Some participants
expressed the symptoms themselves creating feelings of fear and anxiety, while others named
anticipation of attacks as anxiety-provoking. Cathy uses threat language and descriptions of
spontaneous onset of vestibular symptoms in her description here. As noted, the use of threat
language here is slightly more passive, as in, the “ground dropping out” has a different quality
than symptoms “hitting.” However, the “ground is dropping out,” is expressive in a similar way,
as it conveys an (obvious) loss of “grounding.” This may be a more concrete way to discuss
psychological experience as it provides an “image” for how her symptoms cause confusion and
helplessness, which then creates anxiety. She acknowledges periods of psychiatric effects and
feeling “helpless,” specifically around “not know[ing] why” she becomes un-grounded. In a later
response to a question about what strategies she uses to deal with her symptoms, there is a clue
as to why her current level of anxiety might be low. I will return to Cathy’s experience further
along.
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In this section, I outlined a metaphorical concept of Agentic Control which help deepen
participant experience of vestibular symptoms. Many participants experienced symptoms as
external forces, which impacted bodily control and could be qualified by differing levels of
threat and controllability. By participant narrative as well as looking at some of the quantitative
results, experiencing a greater perceived loss of bodily control related to description of
symptoms as more threatening and/or less controllable. This may be linked to greater
experiences of anxiety and higher perceived disability. Participants who could name clear
triggers conveyed a sense of “ownership” over symptoms in terms of experiencing them more
frequently as acquisitions rather than threats. Expressions of self-efficacy came through in
narratives where participants named an ability to maintain bodily control during symptomatic
periods as well as control symptom onset.
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Symptom Experience
At the heart of many vestibular symptoms is the experienced sensation of motion that
does not match actual motion. As such, much of the lived experience of vestibular dysfunction
relies on descriptions of movement and motion. As noted above, ways to describe the “motion”
of vestibular symptoms can be diagnostically relevant, as they can offer a clue to etiology. As an
example, vertigo can be experienced as a “spinning” sensation or as “non-spinning,” such as
“swaying,” or “floating.” These sensations can also be described with reference to a subject and
object of movement: in the environment (i.e., “the room spinning”) versus the self (i.e., “my
head was floating”). While these descriptions are not conclusive of etiology, descriptions of
motion conveyed by metaphors can offer a place to begin to examine where vestibular
dysfunction may be expected and where it may indicate the influence of other factors, such as
anxiety.
Many participants described the kinds of motion associated with their vestibular
symptoms, with metaphor use that suggested the mismatch between actual and perceived motion
can lead to feelings of being disoriented. As such, I organized these into a broad concept of
Stability Metaphors, as participants used motion and stillness descriptions to describe symptoms.
These descriptions were also employed to express becoming reoriented.
Primary metaphor: Being stable
Concrete experience: Experiencing that a stable environment is consistent and
easier to
navigate
Abstract concept: Feeling emotionally consistent, navigating self-experience
Example: “My world was spinning out of control,” “I try and stay still to regain
balance.”
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Spinning. As embodied cognition notes, often we use metaphor grounded in bodily
experience to convey more abstract themes. “Spinning” in vertigo as it was the most used motion
descriptor (82 instances of use by 17% of participants). The descriptor of spinning was present
across peripheral etiologies. With the participants experiencing vestibular dysfunction in this
sample, the metaphor use is non-abstract: “the room was spinning” conveys the sensation that the
room is experienced as literally spinning. Yet participants in this study also express a more
abstract “knowing” that the sensory experience is illusory motion. For this reason, dizziness and
vertigo are sometimes referred to as disorders of motion perception (Barton, 2021).
Experientially, the sensorimotor experience of a “room spinning” violates conscious and
unconscious assumptions about the stability of the environment. These “motion” metaphors are
therefore under the Stability metaphor concept. Conventional use of that metaphor (i.e., “my
world was spinning”) would be more abstract and convey a sense of a loss of orientation and
consistency between self and environment. Consider this account, from a 35-year-old woman
with Benign paroxysmal positional vertigo,
The first time I experienced BPPV was so scary. I felt like I woke
up drunk, or I thought maybe I was having a stroke. When I rolled
over in bed in the morning, the whole room just started spinning
violently.
She is describing experiencing the room as “spinning” despite knowing this is impossible
based on her previous understanding of how natural forces normally orient us. That it is “scary”
speaks to the understanding that she can no longer rely on her perceptual experience as it is
discordant with what she knows about her own normative perception; most profoundly it violates
her assumptions that the surrounding room is stable. Her sensations do not match her other ways
of “knowing.” She searches for reasons (drunk, stroke, etc) to explain why she is experiencing
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this instability. I find this account interesting as well as it speaks to the existential level of terror
(fear or stroke, “violent” spinning) that occurs when our perception is telling us something we
“know” is not “true.”
We have all experienced the sensation of spinning, maybe as children before swinging a
bat or maybe on a tilt-o-whirl at a carnival. The point of play-spinning is to induce disorientation,
to experiment with the experience of the reliable “stillness” of the “regular” world. The above
account conveys that sense of disorientation that comes with unexpected instability. The direct,
non-abstract sensation of “spinning” gives rise to a) an implicit understanding of how consistent
forces normatively orient us, b) experiences of being disoriented and related figurative language
such as, “I can’t think straight,” “my world was spinning.”
Above, I discussed the apparent importance of metaphors that conveyed a lack of agentic
control over symptoms, told through external force language and spontaneous onset. In
discussing the embodied experience of experiencing instability, experiencing the self and
environmental as consistent and predictable seemed to be a key aspect of experiencing agency
and self-efficacy. The quantitative data from this sample connects these as well. Perceived
handicap might be understood as relating to self-efficacy and how much control patients feel
over their own lives (Probst, et al., 2018). Levels of derealization affected level of perceived
handicap, with those who reported severe levels of handicap reporting significantly more
symptoms of dissociation than those who reported mild levels of handicap. Individuals who
experience the environment as being unstable or inconsistent, may have more difficulty
navigating physically and emotionally through their worlds.
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The literal experience of spinning tracks metaphorically to more abstract concepts, for
example, the conventional metaphor mentioned about of something “spinning out of control.”
This is based in concrete experience that stable environments are easier to navigate and
understand than shifting ones. I wondered about how this interaction between “spinning” and
control appeared in this sample as well. Experiencing spinning appeared to track to participant
experience of no longer being in control as well as a diminished sense of self-efficacy. One
participant with oscillopsia described his experience this way:
Perhaps what is the most off-putting is I am a Naturalist, and have
actually worked as an Interpretive Naturalist and outdoor
educator, and now, when I look down. The world spins. The
small insects and flowers that I used to be able to identify are in a
bouncing swirling mess.
The perceived motion of spinning makes it difficult for him to do what he once did.
Oscillopsia is literally defined as, “an illusion of an unstable visual world” (Tilikete & Vighetto,
2011). “Bouncing” and “swirling” disorganizes the perceptual field into a “mess,” as the
environment is no longer still, making it more difficult to parse and identify. This is consistent
with the stability metaphors, as this narrative implies that the world should be stable and the
insects and flowers should, if not be still, be moving in a consistent and predictable manner. In
communicating his visual experience metaphorically, he also conveys more abstract experience:
he is no longer able to catalogue and identify objects in his world, making things a “mess.” The
“off-putting” metaphor is also revealing as it serves as a locational metaphor: he may experience
difficulties self-locating as he is no longer interacting with the world in the way he once did
experientially and professionally. Consistent with a possible loss of identity and the experience
of, this participant reported severe levels of perceived handicap (Dizziness Handicap Total = 54),
moderate levels of depersonalization-derealization symptoms (Depersonalization-derealization
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inventory symptoms endorsed = 16). Interestingly, he reported mild levels of anxiety (Beck
Anxiety Inventory Score = 13). He writes that he has been living with his symptoms for five
years and that they “don’t get worse but don’t get better either.” Perhaps a lower level of anxiety
may be attributed to his adjusting to a bobbing world as a “new stability.” In fact, he writes, “I do
wish it would go away and my life could return to ‘normal' and the freedom I once had. But,
really, could I ever grow my legs back if that were my disability?”
The experience of spinning is generally used in conventional metaphor to describe the
experience of being overwhelmed or not in control. In part this is due to unconscious and
conscious assumptions about the stability of the environment. Patients with vestibular
dysfunction may experience a violation of this assumption more frequently, leading to
disruptions in motion perception such as spinning. This may also this experience of literal
spinning tracks to a sense of loss of control, as participants expressed cognitively or rationally
“knowing” the room is not spinning but having the embodied knowledge of motion. This
“disconnect” appears to relate to a loss of self of control over the environment, as prior embodied
knowledge of how physical forces work seems disturbed. Likewise, this may influence some
patients’ experience of their sense of control over aspects of themselves, including their body
and self-efficacy.
Falling-- Orientational metaphors. Descriptions of “falling” and “dropping” were
included as examples of orientational metaphors. As Straus (1952) outlined, in normative body
comportment, we expect the consistency and stability of the “upright” and vertically oriented
posture. The sensation of falling or fear of falling are slightly different than the illusory motion
of spinning. The experience of “falling” is sometimes literal, rather than metaphorical. However,
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I decided to include descriptions of falling and fear of falling as metaphors as those embodied
experiences may give rise to more abstract affective and interpersonal effects.
Primary metaphor: Being oriented
Concrete experience: Standing upright in a vertical orientation and
having immediate
access to sensory apparatuses
Abstract experience: Confidence, ability to navigate emotionally &
interpersonally, morality
Examples: “I stood up to them,” “I'd have to lay under my desk at
work for at least an hour to feel like I wasn't falling off the
earth."
Falls are not uncommon in vestibular disorders, either because of challenges to
maintaining balance or as part of a vestibular sequela known as “drop attacks.” Drop attacks are
linked to Ménière's disease and cause sufferers to experience sudden trips or falls without a loss
of consciousness (Pyykkö, Pyykkö & Manchaiah, 2021). The severity of these “drop attacks” can
vary. At their most mild these can be experienced as “trips;” at their most severe, they are
experienced as sudden falls. Falling, drop attacks and the fear of falling came up in participant
narratives (n= 23). Fear of falling or experiencing actual falls is not asked about directly on
measure of perceived handicap but is thought to contribute to experience limitation of social
participation (Jørstad, Hauer, Becker, Lamb & ProFaNE Group, 2005). Given this, I was
interested to see how the experience of fear of falling interacted with anxiety and perceived
disability.
Of the four participants who reported experiencing drop attacks, most had been
diagnosed with Ménière's disease (n=3). The other participant reported being diagnosed with
“visual vestibular mismatch” (VVM). VVM is way of describing vertigo or dizziness that is
triggered by visual stimulation. Though non-Ménière's-related drop attacks do occur, they are
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less common, and the mechanisms are less understood (Ishiyama, Ishiyama, & Baloh,
2003). The participant with VVM reported drop attacks this way,
The most vivid experience I have is when the fire alarms began
going off in the high school where I taught and every time the high
pitch noise came out of the alarms, I would literally suffer a drop
attack. It was terrifying for both me and my students because they
did not know how to get me off the 3rd floor. I felt one hundred
percent out of control for the first time in my life.
This experience does sound terrifying. Thinking of the symptom-as-metaphor, being
“dropped” in this way speaks to onset as a loss of bodily agency and, more specifically, a loss of
vertical orientation. As she tells it, she felt “one hundred percent out of control,” which speaks to
the profundity of this loss of bodily agency and orientation.
Despite being diagnosed with a “vestibular-visual mismatch.” drop attacks can be
“stimulus-induced” and occur in the presence of sudden or intense auditory or other sensory
stimuli (Dreissen & Tijssen, 2012). This participant reported anxiety in the moderate range and
her level of perceived handicap in the severe range. Her scores on the Dizziness Handicap
Inventory functional subscale were more than one standard deviation above the mean, meaning
she perceives her day-to-day life and activities to be more severely limited by her vestibular
difficulties. Considering this with her narrative, she appears to attribute her functional
impairments to her strategy of avoiding any situation where there may be loud or unexpected
noises. She writes,
All family gatherings set off my anxiety because I know some of
them will be loud, whether they can help it or not. I love my
grandbaby more than life itself, but he is about to turn two and his
screaming fits set me into a spin!
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Here she does employ the stability metaphor of “spin” with a distinct trigger and anxiety
around a potentially triggering scenario. She does not report in this response the fear of
experiencing a drop attack again. She uses the motion of herself being “sent into a spin” which
conveys loss, both in her own agency and her ability to connect with her grandbaby.
A few additional participants described experiencing falls because of their vestibular
symptoms (n=9), while a greater number of participants reported fearing a potential fall because
of their feelings of imbalance (n=12). Participants were not asked directly about falling, so there
is some limitation in considering which participants chose to include falls as part of their
narratives. Though I expected reported falls to have an impact on perception of
disability. Assessing their narratives, the majority used threat language (n=7), which makes
intuitive sense as falling or experiencing a drop attack implies a causal force “impact,” by
symptoms, a loss of agency over the body as well as the real possibility of being hurt when
falling. One participant who reported a mild level of anxiety and level of perceived handicap
wrote,
During the period when I was having drop vertigo attacks, I felt
like I had no control due to its unpredictability. Driving was out of
the question, and I had to be careful to make sure I stayed away
from walking in areas where I could be seriously hurt if I fell.
Based on her language, it appears that the drop attacks are no longer occurring, which
may explain her relatively low level of anxiety and perceived handicap. Her story implies that
during the time of active drop attacks, her functional impairment was higher. Again, the themes
of “loss of agency” and violations of stability emerge, due to what is described as spontaneous
onset, and the threat of falling. This loss of control and unpredictability appeared to impact her
behavior and limit what she felt capable of doing.
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In contrast, orientational metaphors in this population also served to describe resiliency in
a few cases. One participant discussed getting herself out of a difficult situation, when she found
herself having to navigate on ice in triggering visual conditions. She wrote,
...I finally figured out a way to Gerry rig my hiking stick and went
straight home without finishing my walk. I was scared and yet very
proud of myself for conquering that dilemma. My husband and
father both yelled at me for being out in inclement weather, but I
stood up to them and expressed pride and also found the humor in
the situation.
In this case I find the metaphoric use of “straight home,” and “I stood up to them” to be
particularly revealing, as they are directly orientational. In her experience, they may reveal that
she was quite literally able to “go straight” and “stand up” after navigating away from the ice.
She expressed this as a source of pride and resilience, despite receiving judgement from her
family regarding her choice to go out in bad weather. Note in this account the re-orientational
language is around “conquering” the dilemma and touches on the core elements of vestibular
experience discussed thus far: agency, stabilizing the self/environment and re-orienting.
Drunkenness. Some participants used figurative language about appearing “drunk.”
Figurative language around drunkenness gathers up the previously discussed metaphoric themes:
bodily control, stability, and orientation. Despite not being a metaphor per se, this language came
up so often, including in the clinical language, that it felt necessary to discuss.
The language of drunkenness, while often referring to bodily motion, struck me as
important because it often inferred a social dimension to symptoms. Take these examples of how
the drunk simile was used:
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“[I fear] people laughing at me and thinking I'm weird or drunk. “
“I felt like a drunk wandering around!"
“Fear of publicly making a fool out of myself by appearing drunk (I am sober)
keeps me isolated.”
These participants who used the “drunken” simile endorsed that some anxiety arose from
fear of being perceived as “weird,” “or being made a fool of” or exhibiting the connotations of
being “a drunk.” The fear of appearing drunk comprises this item on the Dizziness Handicap
Inventory: “because of your problem, are your afraid others will think you are intoxicated?”
Nearly two-thirds of the sample (64%) endorsed this item. Further, most participants (70%)
endorsed feeling “embarrassed in front of others” because of their vestibular dysfunction.
I earlier conceptualized agentic and stability metaphors as relating to a loss of agency
over the self or environment. “Appearing drunk” and feeling embarrassed represented to me a
loss of agency within the social environment. There is not a stigma associated with vestibular
dysfunction, per se. However, there is a stigma associated with “appearing” out of control. One
participant wrote, “My balance fails me, and people do indeed notice. It’s embarrassing.” Here
his metaphor use indicates a disconnection with and loss of control over a part of himself
(“balance fails me”) which is seen and noticed by others.
Being “seen” as drunk or acting embarrassingly coincides with the often “invisible”
nature of vestibular disorders themselves. Many patients spoke to experiencing a lack of
understanding by others about their condition. This included family and friends as well as
clinicians. That is, participants observable symptoms are often not understood as being part of a
disease profile. What is observed is someone “unsteady,” “off-balance,” “wobbly,” or
“swaying.” One participant wrote, “Fear of publicly making a fool out of myself by appearing
drunk (I am sober) keeps me isolated.”
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In summary, the experience of symptoms is multifaceted. The nature of the questionnaire
elicited metaphoric descriptions of symptoms that arose from direct sensory experience. This led
to uncovering stability and orientational metaphors which were discussed through the symptoms
of “spinning” and “falling/dropping,” respectively. How violations of the “stable environment”
assumption may impact derealization symptoms was discussed. The impact of falling on
perceived handicap was assessed. A participant narrative was used to see how orientational
metaphors can be used to reflect resiliency. The figurative language of “drunkenness” was also
used an example of how previous metaphor concepts of agency, stability and orientation may
affect patients socially and relationally.
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Symptom Mitigation
As shown above, participants often touched on body control and agency, particularly a
loss of these, when discussing their experience of symptoms. Next, I looked at participant
answers to a prompt asking about what strategies they use to mitigate their anxiety and vestibular
symptoms. This prompt asked, “What strategies do you use to manage your symptoms when you
are in a potentially triggering situation?”
Perhaps not surprisingly, the metaphors in those responses complemented the metaphors
of control and motion found in descriptions of symptom experience. Metaphor use in the
“strategies” responses often related to attempts at regaining control over the self, body,
environment, or all three. Metaphor use consisted of the forced movement of the “self” to
reconnect the “subject” and lessen symptoms. For example, “I anchor myself.” I considered
these Self-object metaphors.
The structure of this metaphor included:
Primary metaphor: The self is a physical object
Concrete experience: Experiencing that having control over an
object means being able to move that object physically
Abstract experience: Emotionally and cognitively “taking control”
of oneself
Example: “I slowed myself down”
This metaphor structures the experience of “regaining” a sense of self-control by
“moving” the self-object physically. This also included its complement, overlaid in Agentic
metaphors: the experience of loss physical control as losing self-control. I will refer to this as
“self-object” metaphors going forward. About a third of participants employed this metaphor
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structure when discussing their strategies to deal with triggering situations (n=31).Examples
included:
“I remove myself”
“I excuse myself”
“I distract myself”
“I brace myself”
“I give myself hope/time”
Of course, this phrasing is common in English. What is notable is that in this sample is
that this metaphor structure was almost exclusively found in responses to a question about how
participants manage their symptoms when they occur (31 instances in this prompt versus 4 uses
in descriptions of symptom onset or experience). This might indicate something about the nature
of the strategies used to maintain or regain a sense of control which, as explicated in previous
sections, is often disrupted by vestibular symptoms. The self-object metaphors fell into two
primary categories: cognitive (i.e., “I tell myself”) and movement (i.e., “I remove myself”).
Linguistically, the subject-self structure of these metaphors implies the outcome of the
taking control of the self will be a realignment of subject and self. Whereas in earlier examples
of “symptom” we have the symptom as subject acting on the self as the object (symptom-as-force
metaphor), in the mitigation strategies it is no accident that the subject is the "entity” acting on
an iteration of the self. In some ways, this transcends the actual meaning of the sentence, as in “I
removed myself” as the “removing” is moving a body from one place to another but
maintaining/regaining control of the self “myself” by the subject “I.” This linguistically refers to
agentic control of the self. This additionally implies that embodied experience of symptoms
includes some measure of self-objectification, as in symptom mitigation, the aim is to realign the
self-object with the subject.
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As noted, this structure was primarily used in responses where participants discussed
what methods they use to minimize their symptoms. The subject-object-self alignment in this
metaphor structure speaks directly to the experience of vestibular symptoms as a disconnection
to an experience of self for a portion of patients. In this project, I used the Depersonalization and
Derealization Inventory to assess symptoms of derealization and depersonalization symptoms,
with the rationale that scores on this measure might provide insight into when participants
experienced a divergence in their “selves.” Let us consider two accounts of individuals who
reported high levels of depersonalization-derealization symptoms, one who employs “forced
action’ of the self-metaphor in their mitigation strategy and one who does not to see how these
metaphors operate in context:
Alice, a 34-year-old woman with vestibular migraines:
I use breathing exercises when I get overwhelmed in public and I
explain to myself that I’m not in danger and my brain is just
tricking me. I also explain to the person I’m with what’s going on
so there’s a mutual understanding of the situation.
Zelda, a 61-year-old woman with Ménière's disease:
I have stopped going out, and also due to covid, it’s so sad that I
have become a recluse. It’s very sad because I was such an
independent, active woman. I also have extra anxiety because I live
alone. When I have attacks, I end up having to call an ambulance
and need to go to hospital often.
Though both participants reported severe levels of anxiety, Zelda reported a higher
degree of perceived handicap, particularly in regards emotional effects because of her vestibular
problem (approximately 2.5 standard deviations above Alice’s score on the emotional subscale
of the Dizziness Handicap Inventory). They reported similar levels of perceived functional and
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physical impairment. These two descriptions of strategies differ in some noteworthy ways. First,
Alice elucidates a strategy for dealing with her symptoms using physical (breathing), cognitive
(“I explain to myself”) and social (“I explain to the person I’m with”) components. Zelda’s
strategies include avoidance and calling for an ambulance. The importance of having a
mitigation strategy at all will be addressed in the coming section. Alice’s use of “forced action”
is cognitive and offers a glimpse into how Alice is experiencing herself: “talking” through an
aspect of herself that feels disparate (“my brain is tricking me”) but ultimately experiencing a
sense of cohesion and self-efficacy. Zelda conveys a sense of feeling alienated from who she
was/is and communicating the experience of not being able to rely on herself to manage
symptoms. This difference may provide evidence for why, despite similar scores on most
measures, Zelda reported a degree of emotional burden more than two standard deviations about
the sample mean (DHI emotional subscale=36).
Symptom control is bringing the self-object into stillness. I noted that often the
“quality” of the self-object metaphors used to describe symptom management included elements
of “stillness,” which may echo back to broader concepts of stability and orientation. As noted
above, primary symptom-as-metaphor of Stability related to a perceived loss of control over the
self and environment, being marked by excess or unexpected motion. This implied a complement
to experience symptom remittance: and re-orienting the self-object is symptom control.
The Stability and Orientation metaphor structure often worked in conjunction with SelfObject, as symptom mitigation was frequently related to experiences stabilizing or re-orienting
the body and thereby the self. For example:
“I brace myself”
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“I ground myself”
“I stabilize myself”
“I anchor myself”
“I slow myself down”
Here is the last quote in context:
I focus on my breath; I slow myself down and just focus on my
surroundings or focus on one thing. I tell myself that nothing else
matters except that moment, and the very next thing I am doing.
The context of the Self-Object metaphor is important, as it illustrates how other metaphor
concepts dovetail. Stabilizing and Orienting in this context are in the effort of aligning the
subject and self that had become “objectified.” I also interpret the “focus on one thing” as
illustrative of the same principle: movement meant to align disparate elements and limit motion.
This complements her description of symptom experience that includes illusory-motion
language, “It feels like I’m walking on a moving walkway at the airport. But my balance is
okay.” Her symptoms include a Stability metaphor, highlighting illusory movement. Her
mitigation strategy includes the self-object metaphor of slowing herself down to counteract the
illusory motion. This is a great example of how experienced motion, in the context of
“symptom” relates to the abstract experience of self.
Metaphoric stabilization of the body and self were routinely used to describe strategies to
mitigate anxiety and vestibular symptoms. The verbs “ground,” “compose,” “anchor,” etc., point
to the existence of a primary metaphor of stabilization, which dovetails with the self is an object,
as the self is the object being stabilized (or grounded, composed, or anchored). Of course, there
are multiple ways to interpreting these metaphors. For example, “ground” and “anchor” might be
organized by their common “downward” force, with “compose” not sharing that orientation.
However, when considered in terms of the primary metaphor of self-object, these instances track
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to a similar sense of the holding, organizing aspect of bringing oneself (or an object) into
stability. This suggests the self-experience during vestibular disruption is one of instability and
disconnection.
These examples reintroduce the aspects of natural forces that organize normative sensory
experience. Anchor is not only a weight “down”, but it holds boats in place. Ground is not only
“down,” but we experience the ground as still and constant as a function of gravity. In
conventional use, metaphors of being “down” or “held in place” is sometimes used in ways to
describe experiences of being burdened or “weighed down.” In this sample, metaphors of being
“down” were frequently used to describe re-orienting and stabilizing forces. This again tracks to
concrete experiences of being unstable and disoriented in vestibular dysfunction. The additional
concrete experience is the feeling that the body has become misaligned from body intentions: the
self or body then becomes “objectified” and attempts at mitigated physical symptoms reflects the
move towards moving the body in line with the agentic self.
As seen in the “focus on one thing” example, strategies towards self-stability often
included the streamlining of perceptual inputs by limiting the sensory field. I will touch on this in
more depth in the next section, but here is one participant’s strategy:
I close my eyes and cover my lids when a scene with fast edits or
bright lights occurs. In general, moving through life with the
constant sensation of rocking and bobbing has taught me to relax
and allow the experience, especially relaxing my shoulders. When
it's really bad, I lay down - this doesn't make the sensation go away
but it helps with the fatigue, and I can fully relax into the
experience.
Here she counters “constant sensations” of movement with stability (“relaxing my
shoulders,” “laying down”) and orientation metaphors (down). Most strategies to minimize
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symptoms included a stilling of the sensory field, which is in direct response to the constant
motion of “rocking and bobbing” that she experiences. The embodied experience is one of
rocking and bobbing, which is experienced as fatiguing. She relaxes “into” the experience, a
locational metaphor that aligns the self with the body experience. Though she does not explicitly
state this, the implication is that the relaxation is not only physical but mental relaxation as
well. This participant’s narrative communicates a sense of agentic control over her body during
episodes as well as the ability to restabilize and reorient her body and her “self.” This
constellation of metaphor use is consistent with her mild reported levels of anxiety (Beck
Anxiety Score =7) and mild level of perceived handicap (Dizziness Handicap total score = 26).
A handful of participants (n=8) shared that they either do not have strategies to deal with
their symptoms or the strategies they have do not offer relief. Metaphor use in this subgroup
included two instances of “self-object”: “The best I have is millennial humor about my situation
and trying to force my way through it” and “Nothing really [helps my symptoms]. I just pause
and gather my wits.” Others detail experiences of avoidance or “withdrawal” from life: “My
Ménière's has led me to withdraw quite a bit,” “I've become housebound because I can't find
anything that helps” and “I can’t [help my symptoms]. I tend to stick to a routine now, so I am
not exposing myself to new places and experiences.” The remaining three participants simply
said they do not have strategies. Looking at the means of this subgroup on the measures, scores
on every measure were only slightly higher than the sample mean. This again might suggest that
having the ability to control or deal with symptoms is related to perceived disability, as perceived
handicap has a clinically significant impact on anxiety.
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On an individual level, the participant who wrote about becoming “housebound” is a 31year-old woman who has been diagnosed with vestibular migraines and persistent dizziness. She
noted her triggers are diffuse: “Stores and shops. In people's houses. Going outside. Going into a
store. Going to somebody's house. Anything social,” perhaps contributing to the perception that,
to have a sense of control, a greater number of places and situations must be avoided. As may be
expected she reported severe levels of anxiety (Beck Anxiety Inventory = 39), a severe level of
perceived disability (Dizziness Handicap Inventory = 90) and endorsed a high number of
depersonalization-derealization symptoms (number of symptoms= 27). Her level of perceived
handicap on the Dizziness Handicap Inventory emotional subscale was especially severe relative
to the sample mean (DHI emotional subscale = 36; sample mean=17.5, SD =8.3). This pattern of
elevated scores was also demonstrated above in Zelda’s account earlier where her strategies
include avoidance and calling an ambulance, as she also endorsed poorly defined triggers, a loss
of agency over symptoms and difficulty restabilizing herself. Both participants employed threat
language to describe their experience of symptom onset. They also touch on the socially isolating
aspects of their disorder.
How vestibular patients describe their attempts at mitigation also define the experience of
symptoms. This is shown through the primary metaphor of the self-as-object. The concrete
physical experiences of trying to reorient and stabilize by adjusting the body or related to the
abstract concepts that the self can be physically moved to become more aligned. This appeared to
touch back on regaining body control, either my forced action of the “self” or by attempting to
control the sensory field. As in previous sections, feeling able to enact control over the body,
appeared to track to experiences of “self-control,” highlighted through degrees of anxiety and
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perceived handicap. As a result, lack of strategy may have an impact on outcomes, particularly
when paired with lack of clear triggers and threat language.
Cognitive Experience
As outlined above, symptom experience is shaped by many factors. Linguistically, the
interplay of “subject” and “self” in metaphor can lend a clue to an important question for this
project: how does vestibular dysfunction shape the experience of “self?”
In developing the metaphors used to frame the experimental vignettes, I relied on the
“locational” metaphor structure “self-as-container.” I chose this as in clinical literature as well as
patient testimonies online, I noticed symptoms were often described as making patients feel
“not” themselves or “out of it.” Participants were asked directly about experiences that made
them feel “out of it” or “not themselves.” Most participants responded to this prompt with a
description of their vestibular symptoms, however a handful responded with descriptions of
anxiety or depression. While some participants in this study spontaneously used self-as-container
language in their responses (i.e., “out of it), by far the most common responses pertaining to
altered self-experience was the metaphor of “brain fog.”
In western cultures, we often associate our experience of “self” with our cognition. In this
sample, the terms “mind” or “brain” were frequently used as the “instances of self.” Participants
described being “out of it” with descriptions of “fogginess” or “lack of mental clarity.” Metaphor
use around this response was interesting, in that it most often reflected how the perception of an
overwhelming sensory field impacted cognition.
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A large portion of the participants reported feeling triggered by an “over-stimulating”
sensory field (n=47, 41.5%). The remaining participants either did not report on their most
triggering situations or mentioned other triggers, the most common of which being “positional”
triggers (i.e., “looking up”).
Participants most often reported visual and aural stimulation as the most overwhelming.
These broadly tracked to etiology, for example, participants with disorders involving the inner
ear most frequently endorsed loud noises or many sounds as being triggering. Likewise, those
with visual disorders often reported vision as the primary overwhelming modality. Participants
reported visual stimulation, such as bright lights or colorful patterns as well as noisy or loud
environments to be triggering. A few participants noted smell as a trigger, though smell was not
endorsed as a primary trigger, rather as part of an array of sensory stimuli that can lead to
symptom onset. As vestibular function is multimodal, it is not surprising that multiple senses
would be included in descriptions of triggering stimuli.
The multimodal nature of symptoms came through in metaphor use as well. Metaphors of
sensation would sometimes “cross modes,” as in this example, “I woke in the middle of the night
in my dark room but could somehow still feel and ‘see’ the spinning.” In this case, the
descriptions crossed sensory paths of vision and felt sense. The metaphor of “fog” may also be
considered cross-modal as it can be both visually perceived as well as felt. The same is true for
the metaphoric use of “white noise,” as an auditory phenomenon (noise) paired with a visual
phenomenon (color). The multimodal descriptions of triggering stimuli may also be perceived as
arising from an overwhelming sensory field, in which specific sensory modalities are difficult to
parse.
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Of those who reported feeling overstimulated by the environment, slightly more than half
(n=24) referred to experiencing cognitive changes. These changes included visual metaphor
descriptions such as, “brain fog,” “lack of mental clarity,” as well as more “literal” descriptions
of cognitive functioning such as, “difficulty making sense,” “difficulty concentrating/focusing,”
etc. As an example, here is a 59-year-old woman’s narrative:
I certainly have a loss of mental clarity - what I refer to as brain
fog - when I am experiencing vertigo. This happens most often in
large, loud, brightly lit places such as Walmart, Costco, a
playground, or sports center etc.
I found the metaphor of “fog” revealing, as it conveyed a “thick” sensory field, which
was experienced as impairing cognition. It contrasts with other common terms of being “out of
it” for example feeling “spacy.” Here is a response from a 47-year-old participant who had been
diagnosed with Bilateral dehiscence and Bilateral vestibular hypofunction:
When my vertigo and balance are bad, my cognitive functioning
decreases, "brain fog". I miss words, pause mid-sentence to refocus
my thoughts. In short, I feel as though my IQ dropped about 30
points.

The connection between “foggy” being “not myself” implied that the experience of self
relates to being able to “see” oneself clearly. There is precedent for this metaphor concept in
Lakoff and Johnson’s outline of “thinking-is-perceiving,” as we gain knowledge about the world
through sensory perception. If the senses are impeded or overwhelming, this could mean the
information we receive is not correct or difficult to parse. These metaphors use sensory modes to
underlie the experience of the mind and cognition, for example the visual metaphor of “mental
clarity” and the auditory metaphor of, “my head is buzzing.”
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In thinking about what unites metaphoric description such as “fog,” “buzzing” and
“noise” metaphors used by participants, I thought of the principle of Figure-Ground perception.
Figure-Ground perception is a principle in Gestalt visual perceptual theory which says we
perceptually group visual stimuli as either “figure” or “ground.” We do this largely
unconsciously, where elements in the visual field become prominent in the foreground (figure) or
become backgrounded (ground). Perceptually, this helps us to attend to relevant stimuli and
parse complex visual scenes (Wagemans et al., 2012). “Fog,” “buzz” and “white noise” lack
clear distinctions as to what perceptual objects are figure and which are ground. Contrastingly,
“clarity” implies sensory objects that are distinct and marked by areas of contrast. As such, I
conceived of these metaphors as falling under the concept of Figure-Ground metaphors, as they
seemed to relate to difficulties sorting sensory figures from ground, resulting in a sensory
environment that feels effortful to parse or overwhelming.
This led to metaphor concept of Figure-Ground metaphors, which included the primary
metaphor:
Primary metaphor: Thinking is perceiving
Concrete experience: Gaining knowledge about the world through
sensory perception
Abstract concept: having thoughts and keeping them in mind
Example: “loss of mental clarity”
Metaphors that contributed to this concept included:
“I feel thick-headed”
“White noise in my head”
“Loss of mental clarity”
“I felt very foggy”
“brain fog”
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Sensory metaphors for mind and cognition are extremely common. This sample used
these metaphors uniquely. He is an example from Roberta, a woman with Ménière's disease, of
how “brain fog” was used to describe the cognitive effects of vestibular attack,
The most recent example of feeling out of it (which for me
personally involves the feeling that is often described as "brain
fog" which typically accompanies vertigo attacks) was less than a
week ago after I experienced a rather sudden attack. Prior to the
attack I was feeling mentally sharp and alert, but within seconds of
the vertigo attack I felt as if I had difficulty concentrating and felt
mentally sluggish for approximately two hours after my symptoms
subsided. I usually feel particularly unstable while riding in a
vehicle or inside large well lit spaces with lots of movement. These
environments can trigger a vertigo attack.
In this example we see again a connection between a stimulating sensory environment
(lots of movement, bright lights, stimuli of a car ride) and the onset of symptoms, including
“brain fog.” She contrasted the experience of feeling “sharp and alert,” with an experience of
feeling mentally dulled. Because the sensory field was difficult to parse due to vertigo, Roberta
experienced a change in her ability to think. This happened quickly, suggesting her brain fog was
not the result of fatigue, but rather a direct abstract effect of her concrete sensory experience.
Even after the most acute symptoms subsided, the mental “sluggishness” continued. To touch on
previous topics covered, Roberta uses the Agentic metaphor of threat language as well as the
Stability metaphors of feeling “unstable while riding in a vehicle.”
Being able to parse the sensory field, such as seeing what perceptual “figure” is and what
is “ground,” helps us attend to and perceive, and thereby “know,” stimuli accurately. I was
curious if this sense of being “foggy” or losing the “clarity” between cognitive figure and ground
might relate to the quality of dissociative symptoms that those with vestibular disorders
experience. I looked at what the most endorsed items on the Depersonalization-Derealization
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Inventory in this sample. The percentage of the sample which endorsed the item is listed. These
included:
“dizziness” (94.7%)
“feeling of not being in control of self” (68%)
“feeling as if walking on shifting ground” (77.2%)
“thoughts seem blurred” (75%)
“difficulty understanding” (64.9%)
“difficulty focusing” (84.2%)
“difficulty concentrating” (87.7%)
“feeling spacy” (76.3%)
The first three listed here track broadly on to Agentic and Stability experiences, the next
group of four can be related to cognitive functioning and the final one might relate to difficulties
orienting/self-locating. For individuals who reported being triggered by sensory “overload,”
these were also the most reported symptoms. These are juxtaposed with the least frequently
endorsed items in this sample which included: déjà vu experiences, body/emotional numbness,
feeling disconnected from emotions, changes in temporal perception and others appearing
strange or unreal. In this sample of patients, vestibular dysfunction did not seem to impact
experience of time, dulling of body/emotional sensations and did not seem to lead to experiences
of “uncanniness.” Rather, this sample most frequently endorsed cognitive impairments, which
may play a role in changing self-experience.
As mentioned in the orientational metaphors section, dissociation in this case may point
to the disconnect between expected experience and perceived experience. It may be important to
consider that symptoms of vestibular dysfunction (dizziness, feeling as if walking on shifting
ground) are counted as “dissociative” experience in themselves. Beyond that, in the “brain fog”
examples, there is a disconnect between what is expected of one’s cognition and actual
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experience. Figure-ground relationships are normative. As in Roberta’s case, the abrupt
disconnect in her experience pre-and post- vertigo onset suggests this perceptual change creates a
cognitive disconnect as well, in other words, how her brain “should” work.
An additional consideration is how anxiety might change the quality of derealization and
depersonalization symptoms. Consistent with the sample-level findings connecting Beck Anxiety
Inventory and Depersonalization-Derealization Inventory scores, individuals who reported the
highest levels of anxiety (in the “severe” range), reported more derealization and
depersonalization symptoms overall (19.31 symptoms versus 14.84 for the sample mean). While
they endorsed the same most common symptoms as noted above for the greater sample, the most
anxious individuals reported these additional symptoms at notably higher rates:
“surroundings seem strange or unreal”
“feel detached or separated from surroundings”
“feeling as though personality is different”
“feel confused or bewildered”
In contrast to the most endorsed symptoms in the sample, these items point to more
experiences of “strangeness” in the environment, as well as what might be considered more
“severe” examples of cognitive changes, escalating to confusion. Interestingly, most of the
participants who reported severe anxiety did not include descriptions of overstimulation by the
environment in their narratives (65.6%). However, this could relate to the earlier conclusion
wherein the most anxious participants had difficulty elucidating their triggering scenarios at all.
As the correlational data suggests, most participants had approximately equal levels of
derealization-depersonalization symptoms and anxiety (I.e., scoring in the “moderate” range on
both measures). Dissociation had statistically and clinically significant impacts on anxiety, as
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differences in depersonalization-derealization symptoms related to different clinical levels of
anxiety. There were a handful (n=4) of participants who reported mild or no derealizationdepersonalization symptoms but severe levels of anxiety. All four of these participants had
diagnoses of Meniere’s disease. On the contrary, no participants endorsed low reported anxiety
and severe derealization-depersonalization symptoms. This suggests that anxiety can occur
without the presence of derealization-depersonalization symptoms. This also suggests that, in
this sample, anxiety is fundamentally connected to experiencing derealization-depersonalization
symptoms.
Figure-ground difficulties may contribute to a sense that the world is distorted.
Experiencing “brain fog” may mean that the sensory field is difficult to “know” giving rise to the
more abstract experience of cognitive “fog” where information is not clear and thereby difficult
to process. This is consistent with the quantitative measures that indicate most participants
endorsed depersonalization-derealization symptoms that related to cognitive impairments. To see
how anxiety may shape this effect, let us consider Emily’s testimonial:
I certainly have a loss of mental clarity - what I refer to as brain
fog - when I am experiencing vertigo. This happens most often in
large, loud, brightly lit places such as Walmart, Costco, a
playground or sports center etc. I experience an increase in anxiety
when I am trying to navigate through a space that is unfamiliar and
it requires visual acuity. Moving through an airport terminal,
where I need to scan for gate numbers while lots of people move
past me, is a good example. My vision is compromised when I am
in motion and that causes anxiety.
Here she describes visually stimulating environments while experiencing vertigo, which
impacts her ability to maintain visual “acuity.” Feeling less equipped to navigate the world that is
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creating a lot of motion, she becomes more conscious of her vision. She then directly relates this
to becoming more anxious.
Many participants used powerful descriptions of experiencing the environment as
“overstimulating.” Metaphors used to describe conscious, cognitive effects of “overstimulation”
revealed a structure of which seemed to interfere with the ability to effectively parse figure and
ground. This concrete experience of losing “clarity” of sensory information, seemed to map
metaphorically onto cognitive experiences where it is difficult to know and process information.
The effect that Figure-Ground difficulties may have on experiences of derealization was
explored, as most participants endorsed some level of cognitive impairment. How anxiety may
shape the experience of derealization was also touched upon.
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Summary
In the previous sections, I have explored different aspects of vestibular patient experience
by examining metaphor use in a clinical population. Patient narratives were analyzed using a
systematic metaphor analysis, which provided a way to examine verbal reports of symptoms
using metaphoric structure. Metaphor structure was used to deconstruct elements of patient
experience and examine how impaired vestibular function relates to affect and altered selfperceptions. Qualitative results were interpreted with respect to metaphor, and results from
quantitative batteries. The aim of the study was to see how metaphoric language use in this
population may provide insight into the correlation between vestibular disruption, anxiety, and
dissociative symptoms.
Analyzing metaphors used by these participants revealed some broad structures of
vestibular experience. The core metaphor concepts here tracked to Agency, Stability,
Orientation, Self-Object and Figure-Ground. In other words, participant narratives employed
metaphor to suggest that vestibular function, through descriptions of dysfunction, is central to the
experience of bodily agency, self-control, self-location, and the embodied grounding of cognitive
experience. These were all explored in terms of how concrete physical experience gives rise to
more abstract concepts. Examining participant metaphors highlighted the persistent dovetailing
of these structures, as in the example of mitigation symptoms “re-stabilizing” the “self-object.”
This study also worked to address how the abstract constructs of anxiety and depersonalizationderealization symptoms shape these broader metaphor concepts.
Some primary metaphors within these broader concepts were explored. These included
symptoms-as-force relating to experiences of body control and agency, and the interaction of
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anxiety and perceived handicap on the languaging of symptoms as “threats.” The absence and
presence of threat language appeared to be influenced by anxiety, especially when coupled with
spontaneous onset of symptoms with unclear triggers, as a function of perceived loss of bodily
agency. The impact of relative loss of personal agency and control had effects on their
experience of self and perception of self-efficacy.
The assumption of a stable environment was explored in terms of the metaphor
“spinning.” This was related to exploring the violation of assumptions about the environment and
how that might impact dissociation symptoms. Further, this loss of “stability” in the body-space
relationship was explored through the concept of self-efficacy and perceived handicap.
Experiences of falling and fear of falling were examined for their impact on perceived
disability. The figurative use of “drunkenness,” combined with symptom-metaphors played a
part in understanding the social nature of disability in vestibular disorders, notably the loss of
social agency, orientation and stability caused by vestibular symptoms.
The concept of self-objectification emerged to understand how mitigation of vestibular
symptoms often implies a realignment of the “subject” with the “self” through the conception
that the “self” is a physical object which can be moved. These were complements to the above
broader themes, with mitigation representing reorientation between subject and self as well as
these metaphors centering agentic control. Participants who reported having no strategy with
which to address their symptoms were also considered.
Finally, the multimodal nature of vestibular function emerged through metaphors of
“fog,” “noise” and “thickness.” These were conceptualized as Figure-Ground metaphors. These
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were explored as ways to address the impact that “sensory overload” might have on cognition
and other “self” experiences. These were further used to examine the quality of dissociative
symptoms in participants with vestibular dysfunction. Quantitative data were incorporated to
explore how anxiety might impact the experience of dissociation in this sample.
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Implications
In this final chapter, I will discuss the implications of this study for embodiment theory
generally, clinical work with vestibular patients, and cognitive metaphor research with disabled
populations.
Embodiment Theory: Vestibular Function Provides the Ground for Perceptual Experience
What can metaphor use tell us about how vestibular function is structured? Metaphor
concepts from participant narratives were used to understand how concrete, embodied experience
tracks to more abstract or affective concepts. Deconstruction of the metaphors employed by this
sample revealed that vestibular (dys)function is central to experiences of bodily agency,
orientation and providing a “ground” for sensory experience by moderating the body-space
relationship. The vestibular system appears to function as a means of allowing movement,
orientation, and self-location to provide the “ground” for sensory “figure.” Moving and orienting
are largely unconscious in normative vestibular function. When this body-space relationship is
disrupted movement and orientation of the body becomes more conscious. This can have
different effects. For example, when symptoms related to consciousness of a lack of bodily
control, this diminished participants’ feelings of agency, resulting in increased feelings of
anxiety, and perceived handicap. How these experienced physical and perceptual changes are
described in metaphor provide a way to understand how vestibular dysfunction disrupts the
experience of self, shaped by anxiety and derealization and depersonalization. Most of these
metaphors are not unique to a vestibular patient population. However, employing certain
metaphors in this patient population deepens and elaborates the structure of vestibular
experience.
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Vestibular function has not enjoyed much attention from phenomenological inquiry.
Shoemaker (2004) suggests this may be because vestibular “sense” does not necessarily have a
“field” by which objects of perception can be presented. As Wong (2017) suggests, it cannot be
turned “off,” for example, like shutting your eyes and blocking the visual field. Vestibular
function is always active. This is due to vestibular function being predicated on a consistent,
unchanging natural force of gravity as well as it being multisensory. Gravity is one of the few,
unchanging constant forces in perceptual experience and so, acts as an organizing force. This
was highlighted through the Stability metaphors, as gravity informs our assumptions that the
environment will be stable. Vestibular function itself is a “ground” of experience as it relies on
the constancy of these forces and serves an integrative purpose.
Wong (2017) argues that an intact vestibular function is essential for self-location.
However, in this study, self-location seemed to only be part of the vestibular picture. Participant
metaphor use suggests the vestibular system is essential for agentic body control and providing a
sensory “ground” of experience, in addition to self-orientation and self-location. Vestibular
experience contained embodied assumptions about how space is structured; in this sample,
metaphor touched on space as being stable as well as how bodily control is dependent on
congruent body-space relationships.
Merleau-Ponty (2011) discusses the body-space connection directly. He writes,
Space, as well as perception as a whole, are marks, inscribed in the
very heart of the subject, of the fact of his birth, of the perpetual
contribution offered by his corporeality, and of a communication
with the world more ancient than the one by way of thought. That
is why space and perception engorge consciousness and are opaque
to reflection. The variability of levels gives rise not only to the
intellectual experience of disorder but also to the vital experience
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of vertigo and nausea, which is the horrifying consciousness of our
own contingency (2011, p. 234).

As noted, in vestibular disorders, space and perception are no longer “opaque to
reflection.” Instead, space and perception become an object of consciousness, something that
needs to be thought about rather than lived through. As he notes, vertigo and nausea highlight the
precarity of our relationship with space. Merleau-Ponty additionally notes that our perception
and attendant emotional, physical, and cognitive experiences are not directly causal, but are
dependent on our “contingent” relationship to space. He writes,
In reality, the reflexes are never blind processes: they
accommodate themselves to the "meaning" of the situation, and
they express our orientation toward a "behavioral environment"
just as much as they manifest the action of the "geographical
environment" on us...The reflex itself makes the stimuli exist as a
situation, and it stands in a relation of "knowledge" to them; i.e., it
prefigures them as that which it is destined to confront (p.82).
This is important in being able to approach anxiety and vestibular dysfunction less
focused on causality and more focused on the changing “meanings” of a situation. For example,
anxiety that arises secondary to vestibular disease might represent an accommodation to the
changing “meaning” of the situation. The changed meaning is apparent in the violations of
assumption about space and body-space relationship loses its “orientation.” The situated
experience of imbalance leads to the “horrifying consciousness” of our dependence on space to
be consistent with our assumptions. Understanding anxiety in this context allows deeper insight
into how elements of experience form a milieu, beyond for example, the anatomical implications
of vestibular-limbic interaction. It offers an alternative view on incongruent body-space
information as a “slip” in the relationship of body knowledge to stimuli (Merleau-Ponty, 2011).
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This is evident in the experiential metaphor of “spinning” and its abstract experience of anxiety
and losing control.
This experiential disconnect that occurs during vestibular dysfunction plays to MerleauPonty's (1968, 2013) conception of “perceptual faith.” Normative perception includes an ability
to be taken-for-granted. Perceptual faith is the “prereflective” nature of perception; we do not
have to think about perceiving, we just perceive and experience the perceptual world as “given.”
However, in this sample of participants, their experiences speak to a distinct disruption of this
“faith.” This is particularly salient for most individuals in this sample who experience episodic
symptoms. In their narratives they discussed onset and then a “symptom,” “episode” or “attack”
is defined by a sudden loss of bodily control, which may be interpreted as an embodied loss of
perceptual faith. The world is no longer just there. Natural forces do not work in a way they are
expected. These are all evidence of a disrupted body schema and goal-directed behavior becomes
challenging or impossible. As in the case of “false motion” metaphor of spinning, there is a
duality to embodied experience: the body knowledge that informs how certain experiences are
supposed to feel and the actual experience that violate these understandings. A deeper
understanding of vestibular dysfunction strengthens the importance of an embodied connection
between person and world. When disconnections occur, it has psychological consequences,
which were often conveyed through participant language.
Merleau-Ponty captures the central importance of space in constituting embodied
experience. Embodied experience cannot occur without a relationship to space and “who we are”
relies on our relation to the environment around us; “who were are” becomes possible because
we understand “where we are” and “what” we can accomplish. Experiences of this relationship
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being compromised, such as in vertigo or nausea, results in the “horror” of our existential
fragility. This conceptualization is supported by the depersonalization studies referenced earlier;
our experience of a self is contingent on our relationship with space. When that relationship is
threatened, we have feelings that we are “not ourselves.” This arises out of the concrete bodily
experience, for example experiencing illusory spinning and losing bodily control has effects on
more abstract constructs, such as feeling not in control of oneself, disoriented or helpless against
external forces.
Anxiety because of vestibular disorder makes intuitive sense in this context. The
connection offers a way of understanding how violating assumptions between a body and space
underpins a range of physiological, psychological, and cognitive consequences. Returning to the
concepts of body ownership, an incongruent body-space relation can affect internal
representation of the “self” (Lopez, Halje & Blanke, 2008). If, for example, if your body is not
where you expect it to be in space, as is the case in illusory self-motion in vertigo, this can
disrupt the fluidity of the body schema and the feeling of a body being one’s own. In this sample,
these affected feelings of agency, as symptoms were often framed as experiences of losing a
degree of body control.
As outlined in this research, vestibular disorders make the usual “givens” of normative
perception conscious and reflective. What constituted a “symptom” conveyed this directly; it was
often the sudden sense that something fundamental had changed between the world and the
experiencer, as evidenced through the loss of body control. Following the “changing meaning of
situations,” vertigo, both symptomatically and metaphorically, might be understood as the
consequence of experiencing a rapidly changing world. Participant narratives appeared to
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resonate with this conception, perhaps most eloquently stated by, “the ground was dropping
out.” This turn of phrase touches back to the reality normative vestibular function is experienced
as constant and consistent. For those with vestibular dysfunction, threat language additionally
conveyed an inherent distrust of what had been previously “learned” about space, because what
has been learned might any moment become “untrue.” The “ground” is not “supposed” to “drop
out.” These shifting set of experiences and meanings, which at times may be labeled
linguistically (attack) and affectively (anxiety).
Without perceptual faith, participants had to think about what had previously been
“given” in their embodied experience. For vestibular patients, this appeared to be how to parse
overwhelming sensory information, having to think about balance to not fall, or how to
“reorient” themselves. This also came through in outlining triggers, as many participants
endorsed certain body/head positions as being triggering. This implied needing to be to think
about their body position in space either to ward off triggering motion or control false motion
once symptoms begin. As Gallagher (2005) mentions, disruption in body schema makes basic
perception the “figure” rather than the “ground.” As this study outlined, vestibular function is
essential for a congruent body schema, as it is a basis for bodily agency, orientation, and
stability. As such, vestibular function is a basis for grounding perceptual experience. MerleauPonty centered bodily perception as consciousness in active relation to the world. When the body
schema is disrupted or disorganized, this self-consciousness also becomes disrupted and
disorganized.
Experiences of the “world” can also affect self-experience, as seen through the construct
of depersonalization-derealization. Participants expressed that the occasional inability to parse
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the sensory field, to maintain orientation through balance or rely on their perceptual clues,
changed their experience of “self.” I attributed this to the work of vestibular function as
providing an organization of the body-space relationship, through the perceptual grouping of
Figure-Ground. Perceptual organization is necessary to parse sensory information as well as to
think “clearly.” Clinical studies suggest that feeling overwhelmed by sensation is a basis for
dissociation in other disorders, such as PTSD (Harricharan, et al, 2017). Part of the design of our
vestibular systems is to integrate multiple sensory modes to make the world appear coherent.
“Dissociation” may reference a loss of coherence, like that kind communicated by a “mental lack
of clarity,” during a vertigo attack.
As noted above, these “changing meanings” can mean violations of certain assumptions
about the body-space relationship, shown through experiences like vertiginous spinning and the
sudden loss of body control. In their mitigation strategies, participants evoked forced movement
to reestablish these connections, often linguistically joining the self and the subject as in “I
gather myself,” as well as using stabilizing forces to regain control over a chaotic perceptual
field. This language again suggests a need to re-organize, “gather” experience during vestibular
symptoms.
All these more conceptual ideas are informed by concrete experience. Most physical
symptoms of vestibular disorders are contingent on a relationship to space and ground, whether
that be issues of imbalance, motion illusion or falling. Disorders are then primarily disorders of
the body-space relationship. Having lost the “grounding” of the learned experience of space,
disorientation occurs. Body agency is affected, and the body-space relationship becomes
foregrounded, making other sensory stimuli difficult to parse. Psychologically, this physical

99

disorientation gives rise to emotional, cognitive and perceptual disorientation as seen through
common symptoms of anxiety and dissociation. I will next discuss these implications for clinical
work next.
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Clinical Implications: The lLanguage of Self, Anxiety, and Dissociation
One of the primary aims of the present study was to deepen an understanding of the
relationship between vestibular dysfunction, anxiety, and dissociative symptoms. Clinical
understanding of vestibular disorders may benefit from the framing of vestibular function as a
grounding embodied experience. This could address the dissociations, or “loss of ground,” that
arise in patients’ lived experiences of symptoms such as vertigo, dizziness, and imbalance. This
framing may aid clinicians in understanding the profound experiential and existential changes
that can occur during vestibular crises. Additionally, this can help develop rehabilitative frames
aimed at “grounding” patient experience to increase self-efficacy.
Language and Diagnosis
How patients describe their symptoms verbally is a significant factor in initial differential
diagnosis of vestibular disorders. Because language to describe vestibular symptoms can be
diffuse, even clinicians can have difficulty with differential diagnoses of vestibular dysfunction
(Polensek, Tusa & Stern, 2009). The difference in description between “imbalance” and
“spinning” for example, and the metaphors that may accompany each, can lend weight to one
etiology over another. Additionally, symptom description can vary based on the presence of
psychiatric symptoms. Paying careful attention to where metaphor use is unexpected or divergent
can lend insight into how other factors, such as psychiatric symptoms or experience of handicap,
impacts participant experiences. Understanding the “symptom as metaphor” can clinicians in to
the psychological, cognitive, and emotional aspects of the experience of “imbalance,”
“spinning,” “brain fog.” Certain metaphors may be present across multiple etiologies or speak to
experience that is beyond the expected “symptom” for that disorder, for example the emotional
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resonances of “spinning” or “falling.” Clinicians may wish to assess how patients and offer
strategies that match patient’s metaphorical expression. For example, do patients express needing
to feel more in control of their body? More stable? Do they need to feel re-oriented? Are they
asking for more mental clarity? Addressing the abstract forms that embodied experience takes
may have a bidirectional effect on concrete symptoms.
Self-efficacy
Agency was interwoven through most of the metaphors outlined above. Agency in this
study referred to feelings of agentic control of the body which related to feelings of agentic
emotional and self-control. Feeling that body movements were not self-generated and
uncontrollable, as in the symptoms-as-forces metaphor, affected anxiety and perceived handicap.
This was based in the concrete experience of losing body control, giving rise to these more
abstract constructs.
Agentic control of the body might relate to perceived handicap as, clinically, self-efficacy
refers to a person’s confidence that they will be able to prevent or manage their symptoms
(Bandura & Wessels, 1994). Experiencing a high degree of physical loss of body control may
inform the conception of vulnerability and helplessness against symptoms, as seen in the Agentic
metaphors symptoms-as-forces. Feeling more vulnerable to uncontrollable forces may create the
sense that patients are less able to control their symptoms or engage in preferred activities,
leading to high levels of perceived handicap. Certain cognitive frames, such as feeling symptoms
are uncontrollable and catastrophic, can significantly impact anxiety and perceived handicap in
patients with vestibular dysfunction (Kirby & Yardley, 2009). The language used to describe a
patient’s relationship to their symptoms is important, as fearing the negative consequences of
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vertigo and dizziness can more significantly impact quality of life than the symptoms themselves
(Yardley, Beech & Weinman, 2001).
A further area of research might be exploring how levels of perceived loss of body
control may impact perceived levels of handicap and self-efficacy. This same metaphor concept
may also inform the experience of emotional control, as higher perceived loss of body control
seemed to relate to a higher level of emotional distress, as measured by anxiety. The connection
between perceived control and emotional distress was also buttressed by the quantitative data,
which suggested perceived handicap had significant statistical and clinical effects on anxiety;
higher levels of perceived handicap translated to higher levels of anxiety. The “concrete”
experience of losing body control, whether through being “impacted” by symptoms, spinning or
falling, appeared to relate to the abstract concepts of self-efficacy and emotional control.
Findings in the quantitative survey data, which suggest that higher anxiety is related to
increased perception of handicap, is consistent with previous literature. Psychological factors
such as anxiety and depression have been found to impact patient outcomes, such as perceived
disablement, more significantly than objective measures of vestibular function (Herdman,
Norton, Pavlou, Murdin & Moss-Morris, 2020).
Anxiety
Anxiety was a common thread throughout participant narratives. Looking at the Beck
Anxiety Inventory scores, this sample reported a level of anxiety that was consistent with other
studies across multiple vestibular etiologies and greater than a control population (I.e., Bayat,
Hoseinabadi, Saki & Sanayi, 2020; Creamer, Foran & Bell, 1995). Broadly, participant
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narratives about anxiety typically related to either fearing the onset of symptoms, as was seen in
the primary metaphors of “threat language,” or experiencing anxiety related to the violation of
body-space relationship assumptions.
The International Classification for Vestibular Disorders delineates between
“spontaneous” and “triggered” experiences of dizziness and vertigo (Bisdorff, Von Brevern,
Lempert & Newman-Toker, 2009). In this sample, participants who experienced their symptoms
as “coming out of nowhere” were more likely to use “threat” language, tracking again to the
metaphor concept of Agentic Control. Linguistically, “threat language” appeared to be a
combination of the symptoms-as-force metaphor structure, combined with a description of the
quality of that force. There has been limited research on how cognitive framing of symptoms
might impact the experience of vestibular dysfunction. One study suggests that when patients
process dizziness as a “threat,” there is an increased chance of chronic symptoms (Whalley &
Cane, 2017). However, using threat language was also dependent on perceived loss of agency
and body control. Addressing “threat” framing without also addressing loss of agency might not
be sufficient to minimize symptoms and moderate anxiety. This could also have implications for
perception of self-efficacy in preparing for and remedying vestibular crises.
The threads between anxiety and perceived handicap in this sample and in the literature
are many. One example is fear avoidance, where in patients avoid places and activities based on
symptom-related fear. In vestibular patient populations, fear avoidance is associated with
increased anxiety and a higher level of perceived handicap (Dunlap, et al., 2021; Herdman et al,
2020). In this sample, a lack of clear triggers, was often associated with participant responses
that named multiple places and activities as potentially dangerous. Again, this could be
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bidirectional: the lack of control over when an attack may occur may generate more anxiety or
pre-existing anxiety may impact the perception of attacks as less controllable. Additionally, lack
of education about the nature of vestibular illness contributes to higher levels of anxiety and
perceived handicap (Kirby & Yardley, 2009). Based on the narratives here, it appeared lack of
clear understanding of triggers itself contributed to anxiety about attacks. Further research
regarding differences in anxiety between “triggered” and “spontaneous” vertigo may further
develop this relationship.
On a clinical and interpersonal level, the unexpected and/or intermittent nature of many
participant’s episodes in this sample appeared to exacerbate the social sense of “loss of control.”
Research with vestibular populations has identified social consequences, or fears of being
embarrassed, as contributing significantly to increased distress and feelings of helplessness
(Nobbs, 1988). In this sample, many participants spoke to the fears of being “seen” in a certain
way despite the illness being “invisible” or “misunderstood.” Drunkenness points to the inherent
values interlaid with experiences of balance, uprightness, self-control, etc. As referenced by
Straus (1952), the literal expressions of symptomology (“off-balanced,” “unstable,” “out of
control”) track to a broader abstract concept of socially acceptable behavior and body control.
Characteristics of Dissociation with Vestibular Patients
As noted above, violations of assumptions about the body-space relationship appeared to
be fundamental to the experience of vestibular dysfunction. Dissociative symptoms, as a
psychological construct, appear to have an association with vestibular dysfunction, marked by
experiences such as derealization and depersonalization. Participants endorsed several
derealization and depersonalization symptoms, at a rate higher than in one previous study with
105

vestibular patients and at a higher rate than controls (Kolev, Georgieva-Zhostova & Berthoz,
2014). As noted in the discussion of results, those with higher anxiety reported significantly
more symptoms of dissociation.
Dissociation in the context of vestibular symptoms is phenomenologically consistent, as
these symptoms represent the point at which lived sensory experience is discordant with what is
known to be “reality” and the “normal” interaction of forces. In this study, this came through in
Stability metaphors, where the unconscious assumption of a stable environment is violated,
creating a sense that the “normal” has become distorted. This tracked as well to Figure-Ground
metaphors where the “rules” of normative sensory perception, grouped by foreground and
background, was violated. This sensory violation resulted in the more abstract experience of
“brain fog” and other cognitive effects.
Motion perception relies on spatial orientation to detect direction and speed of selfmotion as well as moving objects (Dichgans & Brandt, 1978). The difference between expected
motion and perceived motion creates a “disconnect” in experience, as the assumption of a stable
environment is violated. This may provide some insight as to why people with vestibular
disruption, including those in this sample, report higher levels of dissociation than individuals
without vestibular difficulties (Sang, et. Al., 2006). Derealization can refer to experiences that
the world is distorted or “false” in some way. In this case, unstable motion-perception violates
assumption about how the world is normally oriented. This includes the stability we ordinarily
expect from the environment. In fact, many items on the depersonalization-derealization
inventory might be considered “vestibular” items such as “feeling as if walking on shifting
ground," “dizziness,” and “feeling not in control of yourself.” When a normally “consistent”
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environment becomes “unstable,” such as a room spinning, the experiencer may attribute that to
themselves (“self-motion,” “feeling not in control of yourself”) or the environment
(“environmental-motion,” “feeling as if walking on shifting ground”).
Considering this, the experience of dissociation in this vestibular patient population was
distinct. Dissociation in this sample was characterized by the experience of cognitive changes
(i.e., “difficulty understanding”) and different experience of the environment that was relevant to
vestibular symptoms (i.e., “ground shifting”), which related directly to the two “violations”
named above. The experience of “sensory overload” might contribute to this as difficulty parsing
multiple sensory inputs affects balance, even in non-vestibular populations (i.e., Harrichan, et al,
2017). Analysis of frequently endorsed items on the Depersonalization-Derealization Inventory
in this sample were consistent with results from previous studies which suggest dissociative
symptoms in patients with vestibular disorders are related to distorted body-space relationships
(i.e., “feels as if walking on shifting ground”) and cognitive changes (i.e., “difficulty
concentrating) (Sang, et.al, 2006). Items related to more “strangeness” in the environment or
emotional disconnection were not as prevalent as symptoms that related to loss of Agency (i.e.,
“not in control of body”) and Figure-Ground cognitive changes (i.e., “difficulty concentrating”).
Notably anxiety changed the quality of dissociative symptoms in this sample, amplifying
them and adding a greater sense of detachment from surroundings as well as increased
confusion. The influence of anxiety might be considered where dissociative symptoms seem
particularly high. Alterations in proprioception and bodily awareness may be reiterated by
increased panic and anxiety. This is consistent with prior findings suggesting that anxiety affects
the experience of dissociative symptoms in vestibular patients (Kolev, Georgieva-Zhostova &
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Berthoz, 2014). Feeling “overstimulated” by the environment is consistent with recent research
that suggests that visually induced dizziness is associated with sensitivity across sensory domains
(Powell, et. Al., 2020). This increased sensitivity may translate to difficulty parsing specific
sensory domains, disrupting the usual Figure-Ground organization of perception.
Cognitive Metaphor Theory: Methodological Implications
As noted, limited work has been done on cognitive metaphor theory and metaphor use in
disabled populations. Cognitive metaphor theory has received critiques assuming a universal
“normalized” body that allows for the development of shared, embodied language (i.e., Vivaldi,
2010). Previous research in CMT with disabled populations has endeavored to see
experimentally whether other diverse bodily experiences impact use of embodied metaphor (i.e.,
Rinaldi et al., 2018).
The metaphors used in this sample were not unique to patients with vestibular disorders.
This is in part because the concrete experience of vestibular disruptions is not unique to a patient
population; anyone can become dizzy or disoriented and experience illusory motion. However, it
was illustrative to begin with the participant descriptions of regular, concrete experience of these
disruptions and see how these common metaphors related to other clinically relevant abstract
concepts such as anxiety and dissociation.
Interestingly, self-location metaphors, such as the self-as-container metaphor that was
identified as a “background” metaphor, were less frequently used than expected. Instead,
metaphor of stability, orientation and agency were more pronounced. Comparing these uses was
helpful, as it pointed to some of the more salient structures of experience for this sample was less
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about where the self is located and more about what the self can do (Agency) in relationship to
the environment (Stability & Orientation). This example points to the utility of analyzing
metaphors for specific populations, rather than relying on a broader discourse of language to
reveal experiential structures.
The purpose of the vignette in this study was to assess if certain metaphors would be
more anxiety-provoking, based on a paradigm developed by Thibodeau & Boroditsky (2011).
The experimental manipulation did not yield statistically significant results on the outcome
measure of anxiety, meaning the language manipulation did not appear to cause difference in
self-reported anxiety differences between participants. Negative results could have been due to a
few reasons. First, the vignettes may have been too complex, diluting the effect of the different
metaphor frames. Second, the study was conducted online and the outcome measure, a sevenpoint Likert scale, may not have been sensitive or finely-grained enough to assess for subtle
affective changes. Likewise, participants may have experienced other emotional reactions to the
vignettes, beyond anxiety. Finally, the low participant number in each group may have not
provided enough power for a between-groups analysis.
Additionally, metaphors used to frame the vignettes were “common” metaphors found in
the clinical literature and may not have been appropriate or impactful in the current sample. One
aspect of this method of analysis is to examine where subgroup metaphor compares to
“common” metaphors used in the larger population. Metaphor use in this sample did include
variations from the metaphor concepts pooled from the broader selection of clinical, vestibular
metaphors.
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Short-form responses from participants allowed for a “reverse engineering” of embodied
cognition, as embodied experience, specifically “symptoms,” such as illusory motion, were
described directly by metaphor. This made it necessary to assess the “symptom as metaphor”
working from descriptions of experienced motion to understand how these are lived more
abstractly. This was evident in the “motions” of spinning and falling which tracked affectively to
anxiety for example, emotionally and cognitively. This may be a way to address metaphors
relevant to diverse embodiments as, per Sobchack’s (2006) injunction, it brings “increased
attention to where discursive construction meets embodied reality.” Quantitative data allowed as
a “check” to see if descriptions of concrete experience tracked onto more abstract constructs,
such as anxiety, perceived handicap, and dissociation. These did appear to be consistent with one
another, with concrete experience often influencing these constructs, as demonstrated through
sample and individual scores. This adds different data to support the utility of metaphor analysis
to connect concrete and abstract experience. Working from symptom description allows us to
examine how the direct perceptual experience of sensation is organized by metaphor.
Schmitt’s (2005) method of metaphor analysis is phenomenologically based. Being able
to deconstruct metaphor provided an organized method of revealing broader primary structures.
For example, the symptoms-as-force metaphors could be deconstructed to concrete experience of
being impacted by forces/objects. Understanding this allowed for the conception of agency to
come into play: if the forces are imbued with agency, what might that say about the agency of
body/self that is impacted? The linguistic bases of metaphor analysis very useful when
considering experiences of the “self.” The subject-object structures of metaphors were useful in
teasing apart where the “self” and the “body” interacted through the organization of “physical”
and “conceptual” experience, as in the Agency example above.
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Analyzing metaphor in a patient population also illustrated how non-normative
experience of embodiment often produces metaphor that is stigmatizing. For example, being
“unbalanced” or “unstable” has negative connotation, because it violates our assumptions about
how normative perceptual experience should occur, as in the Stability and Drunkenness
metaphors. Because experiencing the world in a way that is discordant with how we understand
basic normative forces to work is disturbing (or exhilarating). Metaphor work with differently
embodied participants may wish to take this into consideration, as metaphor use may be
transgressive or unexpected in these populations. The “drunkenness” simile is an ideal example
of this and reveals the social environment is also prone to disorganization. Drunkenness was
often linked to embarrassment or fears of seeming irrational. While dizziness is not stigmatized
or embarrassing per se, the fear of being perceived as losing control suggests that stigma is
related to a conception of disability as a norm violation. Though the experiencer understands
they are not drunk, the social nature of being observed is an inextricable element of the
experience of disability. Implicit in the use of “drunkenness” is that “self-control” is normative,
good and requires agentic control between body and self. Secondly, this suggests that
unintentional norm violation contributes to feelings of embarrassment. This represents a parallel
process of the experiencer-environment relationship, where suddenly the environment or the self
is in violation of an established norm of expected behavior.
Lastly, the simile of “drunkenness” speaks not only to a fear of appearing “out-ofcontrol” but of being essentially misunderstood and having disability mistaken for recklessness,
frivolity or worse. The nature of vestibular function as integrative, multimodal, and complex
means the array of symptoms and makes vestibular dysfunction especially prone to
misunderstand, even misdiagnosis by clinicians.
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In this study, Systematic Metaphor Analysis was used to examine the experiences of a
vestibular patient population. As noted, research in cognitive metaphor theory has often relied on
the experiences of non-disabled populations. This project showed that metaphor analysis is a
helpful way of revealing phenomenological structures of illness, especially when considering
how related “conventional” metaphors are used. Use of quantitative data provided another means
of assessing “abstract” concepts as they related to the primary, embodied examples referred to in
metaphor.
Limits of the Study
This project represents a first attempt at meaningfully integrating quantitative and qualitative
data. The kind and amount of data presented different challenges and opportunities for analysis.
Metaphor analysis is typically done with longer-form interview data. My method of approaching
mixed methods was with post-hoc exploratory, descriptive statistics. This made statistical
inferences difficult, though I endeavored to include data which seemed to support or elucidate
the qualitative material.
Limits of this study also include a lack of cultural or demographic considerations. Because
of this, my data lacked access to understanding experience in diverse patient contexts.
Additionally, this study included a very broad range of etiologies, making it difficult to broaden
thematic elements that may mark experiences unique to each diagnosis.
As prior noted in the discussion of methodology, the nature of this qualitative data set
presented the need for modifications to Schmitt’s method. Written narrative did not provide
opportunity to develop answers and follow the participant’s lead as in an in-depth qualitative
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interview. The resulting qualitative data was broad but relatively shallow. This meant having to
rethink how to approach analysis in a way that might be feasible and clinically relevant.
However, this approach may not have captured the depth and complexity of patient experience.
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Conclusion
Borrowing from cognitive linguistic (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and qualitative (Schmitt,
2005) methodologies, this study worked to explore how concrete embodied experience gives rise
to more abstract concepts by examining metaphor use in a clinical population. This study, aimed
to deepen the understanding of why anxiety, vestibular dysfunction and dissociative symptoms
interact. I analyzed the short answers and quantitative data from 113 participants with vestibular
disorders. Participants were asked to read a vignette framed by different metaphors to assess
whether specific metaphor use would impact perception of anxiety. There were no significant
results in the experimental manipulation and the qualitative findings offer some suggestion as to
why this was the case. This sample seemed to utilize different metaphors to describe their
experiences than were used to frame the vignettes. The results of the metaphor analyses
additionally generated several primary metaphors, upon which richer contextual descriptions of
experience were built.
Findings suggest that vestibular function provides a “ground” for perceptual experience
and underpins the body’s relationship to space which affects feelings of agency, orientation,
stability, and cognition. The abstract constructs of anxiety and depersonalization-derealization,
as measured through quantitative data, were considered. Findings confirm previous research that
vestibular dysfunction, anxiety and depersonalization-derealization are correlated. Metaphor
analysis suggested that these correlations might be explained by vestibular function’s role in
moderating the body-space relationship, which allows for physical and psychological feelings of
orientation, stability, and agency.
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These findings were considered in the context of clinical and philosophical arguments
about embodiment. This work provided empirical evidence to support the work of MerleauPonty as well as expand the phenomenological literature on vestibular function. Namely, this
study suggests that vestibular function is important of “grounding” the self and experiencing
agency, in addition to previous theorizing that vestibular function plays an important role in selflocation.
Findings from this study also had implication for clinical work with patients with
vestibular disorders. One is that perceived body control might be an important factor for
intervention as that related to experiences of agency, anxiety, and subjective handicap. Feeling a
sense of control over symptoms, including having strategies to “reorient” the self, appeared to
mitigate the experience of anxiety and lower perceived handicap. Dissociation in this population
may have features which are shaped by psychiatric symptoms. Cognitive impairment in this
sample appeared to relate to difficulty parsing the sensory environment. This informed the
experience of dissociation, as the most endorsed dissociative symptoms were relevant to
cognitive functioning. Dissociation in this sample also appeared to impact perceptions of space
and motion as opposed to perceptions of time or disconnections from the environment. Anxiety
appeared to shape dissociative symptoms, adding more experiences of “strangeness” and
disconnection when present.
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Appendix A
Study Procedures (order of questionnaires randomized)
1: Informed consent
2: Eligibility screening
3: Structured questionnaire
4: VAPS
5: Embodied metaphor battery (either self, balance or literal conditions)
6: Post-test anxiety rating
7: DHI
8: BAI
9: Derealization & Depersonalization Inventory
End
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Appendix B
Thank you for your interest in our study.
I am a graduate student in Clinical Psychology at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. I am
working on a study exploring the way language impacts certain physical and emotional
experiences of people with vestibular difficulties. During the study, you will be asked to
complete a survey made up of a few questionnaires. These surveys will ask you about your
functioning, symptoms and experiences. Some questions on the survey are open-ended questions
and some are rating scales. This survey will take about 20-30 minutes.
The study will be conducted online. Though there is no compensation for the study, you can elect
to be entered into a drawing to win a $100 Visa gift card. There is no cost to you to participate.
If you are interested, please follow the survey link for more information and to determine your
eligibility to participate <link>. All of your information will be kept confidential. If you have
any questions, please feel free to contact me by email at abramsk1@duq.edy or phone at 516274-8981. Thank you for your interest!
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Appendix C
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY
600 FORBES AVENUE ♦ PITTSBURGH, PA 15282

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
TITLE: The role of language in the relationship between vestibular dysfunction, anxiety and the
Self
INVESTIGATOR:
Kate Abrams, MA,
Doctoral Candidate
McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts
Psychology
abramsk1@duq.edu
(516) 274-8981
ADVISOR:
Dr. Alex Kranjec, PhD
Associate Professor
McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts
Psychology
kranjeca@duq.edu
217 Rockwell Hall
(412) 396-1613
SOURCE OF SUPPORT:
This study is being performed as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctoral degree
in the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts at Duquesne University.
STUDY OVERVIEW:
This study is looking at the way language contributes to physical and emotional experiences in
people with vestibular disorders. In this study, you will be asked to answer a series of questions
about your functioning, symptoms and experiences. You will also be asked to answer both openended questions and rating scales to describe your experiences. You will be asked to read a
vignette and rate how anxious a scenario might make you. There are minimal risks associated
with participating in this study, but no greater than those encountered in everyday life. Some of
these questionnaires ask you about your experiences with anxiety or to imagine how anxious a
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scenario might make you. This may make you feel some increased anxiety. You may not benefit
from participating in this study. This study is not intended to provide clinical treatment or advice.
Participation in this study will not affect your medical care.
PURPOSE:
You are being asked to participate in a research project that is investigating the way language
contributes to physical and emotional experiences
In order to qualify for participation, you must:
●
●
●
●
●

Be over the age of 18
Be a native English speaker
Have been diagnosed with a vestibular disorder by a physician
Not have experienced a traumatic brain injury
Not have other cognitive diagnoses (such as Alzheimer’s disease or an intellectual
disability)
● Not have been diagnosed with a serious mental illness (such as schizophrenia, or bipolar
disorder).
PARTICIPANT PROCEDURES:
This study is being done in one online survey. This survey will ask you some questions about
how your vestibular symptoms impact your daily functioning. Some of these questions will be
open-ended questions and you will be asked to provide a description of your experiences. Other
questions will ask you to rate some symptoms you may have experienced on a scale. You will
also be asked to read a vignette about a potentially anxiety-provoking scenario and rate how
anxious that scenario might make you. Completing this survey will take you approximately 2030 minutes.
RISKS AND BENEFITS:
There are minimal risks associated with participating in this study, but no greater than those
encountered in everyday life. However, some of these questionnaires will ask you about your
experiences with anxiety or to imagine how anxious a scenario might make you. This may make
you feel some increased anxiety. You may not benefit from participating in this study, but we
hope that your participation can increase our knowledge about vestibular disorders and anxiety
that may help others in the future.

COMPENSATION:
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There will be no compensation for participating in this study. However, by participating you can
elect to be entered into a drawing for a chance to win a $100 Visa gift card.
There is no cost for you to participate in this research project.
CONFIDENTIALITY:
Your participation in this study, and any identifiable personal information you provide, will be
kept confidential to every extent possible, and will be destroyed 3 years after the data collection
is completed. Your name will never appear on any survey or research instruments. All written
and electronic forms and study materials will be kept secure. Any responses you provide to the
survey questionnaire will be de-identified and kept in a password protected file on a password
protected computer. In addition, any publications or presentations about this research will only
use data that is combined together with all subjects; therefore, no one will be able to determine
how you responded.
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW:
You are under no obligation to start or continue this study. You can withdraw at any time
without penalty or consequence by choosing to not complete the questionnaires and closing the
survey window. Incomplete surveys will not be used in data analysis. If you choose to withdraw
your consent to participation after the study ends, you may contact Kate Abrams at
abramsk1@duq.edu or by phone at 516-274-8981.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS:
A summary of the results of this study will be provided at no cost. You may request this
summary by contacting the researchers and requesting it. The information provided to you will
not be your individual responses, but rather a summary of what was discovered during the
research project as a whole.
FUTURE USE OF DATA:
Any information collected that can identify you will have the identifiers removed and be kept for
use in future related studies. Your data may be used in the future for other statistical studies or to
compare with data collected in future related studies.
VOLUNTARY CONSENT:
By continuing with this study I signal my informed consent, my voluntary willingness to
participate, and my understanding that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to
withdraw at any time, for any reason without any consequences. Based on this, I certify I am
willing to participate in this research project.
I understand that if I have any questions about my participation in this study, I may contact Kate
Abrams, MA at abramsk1@duq.edu or by phone at 516-274-8981 or Dr. Alex Kranjec at
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kranjeca@duq.edu or by phone at 412-396-1613. If I have any questions regarding my rights and
protections as a subject in this study, I can contact Dr. David Delmonico, Chair of the Duquesne
University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at 412.396.1886 or
at irb@duq.edu.
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